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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
January 10, 19S6 Conference
List 3, Sheet~
No. 85-637

_________

Hodel (Sec. of-.....
Int.)
~

v.

Mary Irving, ( t ~~
(Indian cl ~:i.-ma~
1. SUMMARY:

Appeal from CAS
(Heaney, Henley,
Gibson)

~-J:-/Civl

)
Timely

Appellant claims that CAS erred in declaring

the escheat provisions of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25

u.s.c.

§2206, unconstitutional as a taking without just compensa-

tion.
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

)

Appellees are members of

the Oglala Sioux Tribe who would have obtained by will or intestacy undivided fractional interests in land if not for the opera-
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tion of section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25

u.s.c.

§2206.

Enacted to address the increasing fractionization

of Indian allotment land, section 207 prevents the descent of
interests in an allotment that are "so small as to be financially
meaningless":
No undivided interest in any tract of trust or restricted
land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subject to
a tribe's jurisdiction shall descendent [sic- probably
should be "descend"] by intestacy or devise but shall
escheat to that tribe if such interest represents 2 per
centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has
earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year
before it is due to escheat.
25

u.s.c.

page 3).

§2206.

(The statute was amended in 1984; see infra

Appellees brought suit in district court (WD SD, Bogue,

CJ) , seeking an injunction and a declaration that section 207 was
[

~

unconstitutional as authorizing seizure of property without the
just compensation required by the Fifth Amendment.
found section 207

constitutio~ecause

The court

it affected only an expec-

tancy of heirship and not a vested property interest.
CAS reversed.

The court agreed that appellees had no vested

property interest in the land.

Appellees' decedents, however,

had a vested property right in the property including the right
to dispose with their property at death.

Appellees had standing

to assert the rights of their decedents who were, of course,
unable to assert their rights themselves.

The decedents rights

derived from the original allotment statute, the Act of March 2,
1889, ch. 405, §16, 25 Stat. 888, 893.

The statute was in the

nature of a bargain: each Indian allottee gained vested rights
through the Act in exchange for a release of individuals' claims
to tribal lands.

The vested rights acquired included the power
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to pass the lands upon death.

"The individual Sioux thus had

'enforceable expectations' that that power was part of the rights
they received in return for relinquishment of their claims to
former tribal lands."

Juris. Stat. at 16a.

tion 207 does not provide for compensation.

By its terms, secThe statute, there-

fore, violated the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The court went on to hold that new section 207, amended
after the initiation of the litigation, also was unconstitutional
"insofar as the new provision preserves the language of the old."
Juris. Stat. at 17a.

The new statute provides:

[I have itali-

cized the 1984 changes]
(a) No undivided interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise
subject to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descend by intestacy or devise but shalll escheat to that tribe if such
interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total
acreage in such trach and is incapable of earning $100 in
any one of the five years from the decedent's death.
Where the fractional interest has earned to its owner
less than $100 1n any one of the f1ve years before the
decedent's death, there shall be a rebuttable resum tion
that such 1nterest 1s 1ncapab e of earn1ng
00 1n any
one of the five years following the death of the decedent.
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the devise of
such an escheatable fractional interest to any other owner of an undivided fractional interest in such parcel or
tract of trust or restricted land.
(c)
Notwithstanding the ~revisions of subsection (a),
any Indian tribe may, subJect to the approval of the Secretary, adopt its own code of laws to govern the disposition of interests that are escheatable under this sectlon, and such codes or laws shall take precedence over
the escheat provisions of subsection (a), provided, the
Secretary shall not approve any code or law that fails to
accom~lish the purpose of preventing further descent or
fract1onation of such escheatable interests.
/

Pub. L. No. 98-608,§1, 98 Stat.3173.
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3. CONTENTIONS:

Appellant contends that section 207 is a

carefully tailored measure that falls well within whatever limits
the Fifth Amendment might be thought to impose on such a regulatory statute to ensure that it is not an unconstitutional taking.
The seven factors that appellant lists to support this conclusion
can be distilled into two central points.

First, section 207

does not affect any substantial property interests: it only applies to de minimus undivided fractions of the allotment; it only
affects the owner's ability to dispose of the property at death;
it is unlikely to undermine investment-backed expectations.

Sec-

ond, section 207 does not arbitrarily expropriate property for
government use but instead effects an equitable solution to the
uneconomical fractionization of Indian land:

by escheat the land

passes to the Indian tribe, not to the government; to the extent
potential heirs or devisess retain a nexus with the tribe, they
stand to benefit in some way by the operation of the provision.
CAB erred in finding that the Sioux allotment statute was a
kind of contract in which Congress conferred on individual allottees and every succeeding generation of their descendants a permanent and vested right to be exempt from whatever amendments
Congress might adopt to govern the distribution of a decedent's
property.
Appellant also challenges CAB's holding that the amended
section 207 is unconstitutional.

None of the interest of the

decedents in this case are affected by the amended statute. "Because there was no case or controversy regarding the application
of the amended Section 207 to the parties before the court of

- 5 -

appeals, that court had no authority to invalidate that provision." Juris. Stat. at 25.
Finally, appellant notes that the issue is substantial.
4,430 property interests escheated to the tribes concerned during
the period that the original version of Section 207 was in effeet.

Moreover, in light of CAS's invalidation of the amended

statute, appellant has ordered that no final distribution be made
of allotment property probate proceedings in the Eighth Circuit
pending this Court's decision, "and a cloud has been cast over
probate proceedings elsewhere as well." Juris. Stat. at 26 (citing a case filed in Idaho) .1
Appellees contend that CAS's decision was correct in light
of Choate v. Trapp, 224

___,;

u.s.

665 (1912). In Choate, the allotment

act provided that each tribal member was to receive an allotment
which was to be non-taxable for a limited period of time.

This

Court held that the allottees, individual owners of nontaxable
land, possessed a vested right to the tax exemption and Congress
had no power to remove the exemption without compensation.

Here,

the original allottees possessed a vested right to pass property
acquired by allotment upon death.

Appellee's argument that the

property right involved is de minimus was rejected by the Choate
Court:

lAppellant agrees with the court of appeals that compensation
is not available from the United States for any taking that might
have occurred. Section 207 does not provide for compensation,
and, in light of its legislative history, "we do not believe that
Congress intended that compensation nevertheless be available in
a suit against the United States under the Tucker Act." Juris.
Stat. at 22, n.5. Cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 s.ct. 2S62
(19S4).

- 6 -

Under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment there was no
power to deprive him of the exemption than other rights
in property. No statute would have been valid which reduced his fee to a life estate or attempted to take from
him ten acres, or fifty acres, or the timber growing on
the land •••• It is conceded that no right which was actually conferred upon the Indian can be arbitrarily abrogated by statute.
224

u.s.,

at 674.

Appellants' argument that the escheat to the

tribe somehow saves the statute ignores the distinction between
an individual Indian's property and tribal property.

Again, as

this Court stated in Choate, "there was no indication that the
power of wardship conferred authority on Congress to lessen any
of the rights of property which have been vested in the individual Indian by prior laws or contracts." 224
4. DISCUSSION:

u.s.,

at 67B.

Jurisdiction is proper and the federal ques-

tions presented appear substantial.

CAB's invalidation of the

original statute, appellant claims, affects over four thousand
escheated property interests.

Each interest, however, is small -

- property that has not produced $100 in income in the past year.
CAB's invalidation of the amended statute, however, will affect
thousands more in years to come.
On the merits, CAB's decision to invalidate the amended
statute appears improper.

First, as noted above, the 19B4 amend-

ments substantially refine the method by which an escheatable
interest is determined.
new provisions.

CAB, however, did not discuss any of the

Second, none of the appellees challenged the

amended statute; moreover, since the new statute did not affect
any of their interests, they had no standing to challenge its
constitutionality.

Finally, appellees in their motion to affirm
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do not mention, much less attempt to support, CAS's invalidation
of the amended statute.
The validity of the old statute is a close call.

Appellant

seems to claim that the original act did not give Indians the
property right asserted in this case because the grant "to his
heirs according to the laws of the State or Territory" only gave
Indians the right to pass their land through intestacy.

In 1910

Congress gave Indians the right to dispose of property by will.
The original "bargain," one could argue, did not give to Indians
the right which they know claim is taken.

Thus, Congress, like

any state, is free to exercise the power, "which every state and
sovereignty possesses, of regulating the manner and term upon
which property real or personal within its dominion may be transmitted by last will and testament, or by inheritance."
Grima, 49

u.s.

490 (1950).

Mager v.

On the other hand, CAS's conclusion

that such language was intended to give Indians the whole bundle
of rights associated with property ownership is supported by the
notion that "statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indians
tribes are to be liberally construed, with doubtful expressions
being resolved in favor of the Indians."

Three Affiliated Tribes

v. Wold Engineering, 104 S.Ct. 2267, 2275 (19S4).

If the origi-

nal allotment did grant Indians these property rights, Choate
would support CAS's holding that Congress cannot exercise its
sovereign power without just compensation.

If the Indians were

granted a complete fee in the original allotment, the resolution
of the case would depend on a standard, if perhaps difficult,
application of takings clause analysis.

- 8 -

The case falls within this Court's appellate jurisdiction
and the federal questions presented are substantial.

According-

ly, I recommend that the Court note probable jurisdiction.
There is a response and a motion for leave to file an amicus
brief and the brief itself by the Yakima Indian Nation.
December 20, 1985
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No. 85-637, Hodel, Secretary of the Interior v. Irving, et al.
(CA 8)
Memorandum to File
This is another litigation over Indian property rights.
At issue is the constitutionality of § 207 of the Indian Land
Consolidation Act of 1983, that became effective on January 12,
1983.

It provides that certain de minimis undivided fractional

interests held by individual Indians in trust or restricted
allotments shall not

descend~testacy

escheat to the tribe.

or devise, but shall

~

Over the years, going back to 1887, various statutes have
authorized the allotment of land on reservations to individual
Indians.

In order to protect the allottees against the unwise

alienation of their land, § 5 of the General Allotment Act
provided that an allotted parcel was to be held in trust by the
United States for a period of 25 years or for such further
period as the President might prescribe.

The allotment policy

untimately was rejected by Congress in 1934, and further
allotments were prohibited.

Subsequently, Congress extended

indefinitely the trust or restricted period of the then existing
allotments.

Section 5 of the General Allotment Act provided

No. 85-637

2.

that, upon the death of the original allottee, the land would
continue to be held in trust for "his heirs according to the
laws of the state or territory where the land is located."
According to the SG's brief (p. 4), the statutory provision
had the effect of preempting the inherent right of an Indian
tribe to regulate the descent and distribution of the property
of its members.
Apparently with the passage of time, the heirs or devisees
of allotted land received undivided fractional interests in
allotments.

Each such fractional interest often was further

subdivided upon the death of the heir or devisee who owned it.
After several generations, as the SG puts it, "ownership of
individual allotments often became extremely fragmented."
The consequences of the fractionated land ownership are
set forth in the Senate Report on the amendment of 1984, and
also are stated on p. 8 of the SG's brief.

There is no

question that the fractionated allotments caused serious
problems when an Indian died leaving a will or intestate.
To deal with this problem, § 207 of the Act of 1983 as originally enacted, provided that an undivided interest
in trust or restricted land within a tribe's reservation, or
subject to its jurisdiction, that represents two per cent or
less of the total acreage of the tract, and has earned its owner

No. 85-637

3.

less than $100.00 in the preceding year, shall not descend
by intestacy or devise.

Rather, such fractional interests

shall escheat to the Indian tribe.
Appellees, potential heirs or devisees of parents who
had died possessed of interests in allotted land, filed this
suit on October 20, 1983 in U.S. District Court.

They challenged

the constitutionality of § 207 on the ground that it resulted in
a taking of property without just compensation.

The decedents

of appellees all had died subsequently to the effective date of
§

207 (January 12, 1983) and either in March or April of that

year.

The district court found no violation of the Fifth

Amendment.

It reasoned that the rights of succession to the

property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are
created by statute; that nothing in the Constitution prohibits
a legislature from limiting, conditioning, or even abolishing
the power of testimentary disposition.

The CA reversed, holding

that § 207 as enacted in 1983 was invalid, and further that
the amendment adopted in 1984 also was invalid.

It acknowledged

that Congress may alter the rights to property that have not yet
vested an individual Indian, and also CA 8 recognized that the
interference with any expectation of heirship did not result in
the taking of vested property interest .
held that § 207 does

The CA nevertheless

interfer~unlawfully with a vested right in

4.

No. 85-637

the original allottee and his successors to pass the lands
upon death.

The CA concluded that the effect of § 207 was

to "reduce the ownership interests of the allottees from
fees to life estates, a diminution which the Supreme Court
suggested in Dicta would constitute a taking without compensation
~

in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S.

665, 674 (1912).
Rather than prolong this memo (dictated to refresh my memory
generally), I refer to the SG's summary of argument (pp. 17-22
of his brief) for an excellent statement of the Government's position.

In brief summary, the SG first acknowledges that the

authority of Congress over the property of individual Indians
is subject to constitutional limitations.

But, the SG contends

that "every soverign possesses the right to regulate the manner
and terms upon which property may be transmitted at death,
as well as the authority to prescribe who shall and who shall
not be capable of taking it."

I observe here that although I

am not familiar with the cases cited by the SG, I am not sure
from reading his brief that anyone of them squarely supports
the foregoing statement.

As CA 8 observed, if the SG's state-

ment is taken literally, all fee simple interest in effect
would be reduced to life estates.

No. 85-637

5.

I do not believe, however, that the Government's
position depends on what seems to me to be a rather
extreme statement.

Here, § 207 is quite limited, as

it affects only fractional interests of minimal value.
These interests have resulted in intractable problems.
Moreover, the owner of these interests may sell or donate
them during his or her lifetime, and of course may retain
any income - as unlikely as this may be.

As a matter of

common sense, the position of the Government has great
appeal and I would like to find a principled basis for
supporting it.
The brief on behalf of appellees, however, is well written
and makes a rather strong argument for the view that there has
been a violation of the Fifth Amendment taking clause.
CA 8, appellees rely on Choate v. Trapp.
§

As did

They argue that

207 is not "regulation of property interests".

Rather, it

is a "taking of such interests without compensation."

No. 85-637

6.

As I am not at rest, I would like a memorandum from my
Clerk that addresses the validity of the Government's position
that the State has plenary authority over the dispostion of
property at death.

I am not certain that if the Government is

wrong in this position that it necessarily loses in this
particular case, particularly in view of the fact that the
allotted land remained in trust.

L.F.P.

rjm 07/25/86

BENCH
To:
From:

July 25, 1986

Mr. Justice Powell

~nald

Re:

Hodel v. Irving, No. 85-63

OJ-/._, '1
Questions Presented by the SG•
/

1.
Act of

Whether section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation

1983,

25

U.S.C.

§2206,

which

provides

that

certain de

minimis undivided fractional interests held by individual Indians
in trust or restricted allotments shall not descend by intestacy

-------

or devise,

_
_,

___ ______

- instead shall escheat.._ to the tribe, results in a
but

taking of private property without the payment of just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

L..

2.

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that

Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, as amended by
Congress in 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-608, 98 Stat. 3171, also is unconstitutional, even though the amended version does not apply to
any of the

interests

in allotments covered by appellees'

dece-

dents.

I.

Background and Proceedings Below

The issues raised by this case require an unusually detailed factual statement, beginning with the Treaty of Fort Laramie, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, which created the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation in South Dakota.

That treaty vested

the Sioux tribe with title to most of what is now South Dakota.
In the 1880s, Congress instituted a policy of transferring land
from the Indian tribes to the members of the respective tribes.
Under section 12 of the Treaty of Fort Laramie, Congress could
not make such a transfer of the Sioux lands without consent of
three quarters of the adult male Sioux.

Congress first attempted

to transfer these lands by means of an Act of Apr. 30, 1888, ch.
206,

25 Stat.

94.

Because the Sioux rejected the provisions of

the 1888 Act, Congress made minor changes and repassed the statute as the Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888 (the "Sioux
Allotment Act 11 or

11

SAA 11 }

•

The Sioux accepted the 1889 statute

and the allotment program began.
Under the Sioux Allotment Act, each member of the tribe
would eventually receive a parcel of 160, 80, or . 40 acres, de-

3.

pending on a variety of circumstances.
provident

alienation,

the

SAA §8.

allotted parcels were

trust by the United States for 25-35 years.

To prevent imto be held

SAA §11.

in

Finally,

the SAA identified the beneficiary of the trust as "the Indian to
whom such allotment shall have been made, or, in case of his decease, of his heirs according to the laws of the State or Territory where such land is located."
ed
576,

the
48

"IRA"}.

allotment
Stat.

984

policy

in

the

(codified

at

Id.

In 1934, Congress reject-

Indian Reorganization Act,
25

u.s.c.

§461

et

seq.}

ch.
(the

That statute prohibited further allotments and extended

indefinitely the period during which the United States would hold
the land in trust.
Over the years, the Indians' individual interests in the
allotted parcels became increasingly fractionated.

For example,

eated in this case was a 1/3645 undivid-

--~------------~~-------------Nor was

ed interest in a 320.12 acre tract.
of interest uncommon;
all

this fractionation

in 1960 a Senate Report noted that 1/4 of

allotted parcels were owned by more

fractionation caused several problems.

than six heirs.

This

Most importantly, it made

sale or lease of many parcels practically impossible, because of
the difficulty of discovering the identity of, and securing consent from,

the fee owners.

The accounting costs incurred by the

government rose with the fractionation also, so that many parcels
did not generate enough income to cover their share of the accounting expenditures.
In response to this problem, Congress enacted the Indian
Land Consolidation Act of 1983 ("ILCA"}.

Section 207 of that Act

~.

("section 207"} provided that small interests in allotted parcels
would

escheat,

from

the

individual

tribe, on the death of the owner.
those that constituted both

(a}

Indian

to

the

particular

The escheated interests were

less than 2% of the entire par-

cel, and (b) earned their owner less than $100 income in the preceding year.

Congressional

directly applicable

to

amendments

this

case,

in

1984,

relaxed

the

which

are

requirements

not
so

that no parcel would escheat if the heir could show that the parcel was capable of earning $100
death.

in any of the five years after

The 1984 amendments also proscribed the escheat of inter-

ests devised
parcel.

to persons who owned other

Finally,

under

interests

the new statute,

in the same

individual tribes can

adopt their own codes to deal with this problem, so long as they
accomplish the statutory purpose.
Appellees
under

filed

this

action

challenging

the

statute

the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the federal

constitution.

Appellees are heirs or potential heirs of persons

who possessed interests subject to escheat under ILCA §207.

The

district court rejected the claim, but CA8 reversed, holding that
the statute took property without compensation.

II.

Discussion

In this memo, I address the following three issues:
standing,

(2}

there

standing,

is

taking,

Texaco claim fails.

and

that

(3}
there

Texaco v. Short.
was

not

a

( 1}

I conclude that

taking,

and

that

the

5.

A.

Standing

Although the parties do not contest standing,
substantial question.
not because

it

The

lower court struck down section 207

took property

from

property from Irving's decedent.
only

to establish

dents."

Irving,

the Appellees,

but because

it took

On appeal, the appellees "seek

the vested property

Brief for

it is a

interest of

at 13 n. 3.

their

dece-

Despite the SG' s

implicit concession, the Court still should examine the question.
See,

e.g., Bender v.

Williamsport Area School District,

106

s.

Ct. 1326 (1986).
This

issue

presents

two

separate

inquiries:

first,

whether Irving can meet the Article III requirements of injuryin-fact and controversy; second, whether this Court should apply
its prudential standing

limitations

to bar

review.

Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
(1984).
fied.

In this case,
First,

the Article III

Irving has

lost interests

u.s.

See,

e.g.,

947, 954-55

requirements are satisin land that she would

not have lost except for application of section 207; second, she
has litigated this case with sufficiently "concrete adverseness,"
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-05 {1962), to present a case or
controversy within the meaning of Article III.
Whether

the Court should exercise its prudential power

to hear the case is not so clear.

The Court once stated:

"Ordi-

narily, one may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the
constitutional rights of some third party."
346

u.s.

249, 255 (1953).

Barrows v. Jackson,

The application of this rule--commonly

o.

referred to as the jus tertii rule--furthers two separate interests:

first,

necessarily,

that "courts should not adjudicate such rights unand

it may

be

that

in

fact

the holders of

those

rights do not wish to assert them": and second, that "third parties themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own
rights."

Singleton v. Wulff,

428

u.s.

rality opinion of JUSTICE BLACKMUN).

106, 113-14

(1976)

(plu-

The modern Court has relied

on two factual elements in deciding this question:

the relation-

ship of the litigant to the rightholder: and "some genuine obstacle" to assertion of the right by the rightholder.

Id., at 112-

114 (1976).
You dissented
sion in Singleton.

from JUSTICE BLACKMUN 1 s

standing discus-

You argued that the standing requirement had

not previously been satisfied by a "genuine obstacle," but only
"when such

litigation

Id., at 126.
not on the
role."

in all practicable terms

impossible."

You argued that the prudential inquiry should turn
"quality of advocacy,"

but on

the "proper

Id., at 124 & n.3 (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297

346-48 (1936)
your

is

(Brandeis, J., concurring)).

opinion was

judicial

u.s.

288,

The general thrust of

that JUSTICE BLACKMUN 1 s approach confused the

constitutional and prudential inquiries and that it paved the way
for decisions that could completely ignore the prudential considerations

put

so

forcefully

This prediction has
this area
Munson,

come

by

true,

Justice
as

Brandeis

the most

in

Ashwander.

recent decision in

(a decision which you did not join) demonstrates.

467

u.s.,

at 954-59

See

(rejecting a jus tertii claim, even

7.

though the plaintiff made no showing that the actual rightholders
were incapable of bringing suit).
In Craig v.

Boren,

u.s.

429

190

(1976),

a

endorsed JUSTICE BLACKMON's opinion in Singleton.

full Court

JUSTICE BREN-

NAN's opinion for the Court, which you joined, stated:
The[] prudential objectives [supporting the jus tertii
rule] cannot be furthered here, where the lower court
has entertained the relevant constitutional challenge
and the parties have sought--or at least have never
resisted--an authoritative constitutional determination.
In such circumstances, a decision by us to forgo
consideration of the constitutional merits in order to
await the initiation of a new challenge to the statute
by injured third parties would be impermissibly to foster repetitive and time-consuming litigation under the
guise of caution and prudence." Id., at 193-94 •

....cr..s_ City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital,
239, 243 (1983)

463 U.S.

(rejecting a jus tertii challenge because accept-

ance would lead to dismissal of the writ of certiorari, and affirmance

of

the

state

court

decision

in which

the

plaintiffs

won).
In light of Craig, I think the Court will find Irving's
standing sufficient.
~

Craig resolved a question very similar to

the one here without any examination of the need to avoid unnecessary

adjudication of

quoted

above

further

could

discussion.

constitutional questions.

dispose of
Although

the standing
I

have

The

language

issue here without

substantial

reservations

about this disposition,

based on your opinion in Singleton, 428

u.s.,

I will not belabor the point in this al-

at 123-24 & n.3,

ready lengthy memorandum.
question

in a

I

have outlined my thoughts on this

separate memorandum and will provide a more de-

tailed discussion if you are interested.

o.

B.

Taking

In

this

section

I

address

first

the

general

taking

clause analysis applicable to this question and then the specific
Indian-based concerns that controlled CAS's decision of the case.

1.

Takings

in General. --Legislatures have broad power

to regulate the descent of property, whether by will or by intestate succession.

In fact,

the Court has stated that "[n] othing

~r
in t~e { ederal Consti ~ forbids ~~e legislature of a state to
.~r~~it, co~n, ~-abolish ~e power o~ ' testamentar;'dis
posi tion

over property within

Co. v.

~

taries

on

314 U.S. 556, 562

its

jurisdiction."

(1942); see 5 G. Thompson, Commen-

the Modern Law of Real Property §§2405-2406

Nor is this broad power inapplicable to Indians.
v. Hickel,

Irving Trust

397 U.S. 598,609

(1970);

concurring); Jefferson v. Fink, 247

(Harlan, J.,

288, 294 (1918).

With the breadth of this power in mind,
takings analysis.

See Tooahnippah

id. at 612-13

u.s.

(1979).

I

turn to the

The Court's most recent analysis of this ques-

tion has focused on three factors:
(1) "the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant"; (2) "the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"; and ( 3) "the character of the governmental action." v connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 106
s. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986) (quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 u.s. 104, 124
(1978)).
~

f

As to the economic impact, Congress has

.....r ~~ plication
t.N-Y"".

~~

li~ted

the ap-

of section 207 to small interests, specifically those

that both (a) constitute less

tha~

of the affected parcel, and

9.

{b)

earned the decedent less than $100 in the year immediately

preceding death.

The SG argues that "Congress reasonably could

determine that such an interest is sufficiently de minimis in its
relative economic value and reflects a sufficiently insubstantial
stake in the allotted parcel as a whole to warrant its devolution
to the tribe in lieu of still further fractionation."
the Appellant, at 33.
make

inter vivos

Brief for

Moreover, because the Indians can still

transfers of their

interests,

they have some

chance of retaining the economic value of their interests.

This

factor favors the SG.
Nor does the statute interf€re with an investment-backed
All of the individual interests in allotted parcels
----·---···------~
were acquired without anv investment whatsoever by the individual
expectation.

,...___-------~-

interests; Congress
simply transferred title from the tribe to
.._,__,
the

individuals.

...._________..

Moreover,

it

is unlikely that a substantial

number of the escheated interests have received improving investments;

if they had, they probably would not have been so value-

less as to come within the reach of section 207.
~)

Only on the ~~--the nature of the government
action--do the parties join issue.
ments worthy of mention here.

The SG makes several argu-

First, he points out that the land

has not been escheated back to the federal government, but to the
tribe.

The

individual

Indians

through their tribal membership.

retain

an

interest

in

common

Thus, "[a] lthough the escheat

of any particular parcel might advrsely affect [one Indian, they]
presumably stand to benefit by the escheat of other interests to
the tribe."

Id., at 32.

.LUo

More importantly from my point of view, Congress acted

------not

here to increase the net value of the allotted parcels,

to

transfer some interest from a private party to the government.
Under

the old system,

the administrative costs on many parcels

exceeded the income of the parcels.

The divided ownership made

economically productive use of the land all but impossible.

The

new system is designed to alleviate that problem, increase effective use of the land, and thus provide more income for all members of the tribe.

I think this is like the "reciprocity of ad-

vantage" described by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,

260 U.S.

that opinion,

I

393,
think

415

(1922).

there

is

Whatever the other defects of
something of

substance to this

point.
Finally, on the doctrinal front, the SG argues that this
case is governed by Andrus v. Allard, 444

u.s.

51, 65-66

(1979).

That case considered a federal statute that prohibited the commercial sale of certain parts of protected birds, mostly bald and
golden eagles.

The Court

rejected a

takings clause challenge,

stating:
The regulations challenged here do not compel
the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a significant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full "bundle"
of property rights, the destruction of one "strand" of
the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must
be viewed in its entirety . • • .
The SG focuses on the important rights retained by the decedents
in this case.

--......._

enter,

sell,

------------

~
The statute
does not alter their rights to use,
or earn income from the parcel.

It only prevents

11.

them

from

passing

it at death

unless

they purchase

sufficient

other interests in the same parcel to put their interest out of
the reach of section 207.
Irving argues

that Allard is inapplicable because "the

result of taking this 'strand' is to extinguish the property interests of the decedents."
ing Loretto v.
(1982)).

Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,

458 U.S.

419

In Loretto the Court found a taking because the govern-

mental action did
'bundle'

Brief for the Appellees, at 30 (cit-

"not simply take

of property rights:

single

it chop[ped]

taking a slice of every strand."
Loretto is helpful here.

a

'strand'

from the

through the bundle,

Id. at 434-35.

I do not think

Loretto acknowledged that it dealt with

the special circumstances of a permanent physical invasion, which
almost always constitutes a taking.
In short,

I

See id., at 432.
l'

ll

do not think this is a taking.

two Penn Central factors favor the SG.

The first

On the only questionable

factor--the nature of the governmental action--! lean toward the
SG.

The only strand extinguished here is one traditionally sub-

ject to plenary government control.

When that control is exer-

cised to benefit the owners of the interests in question,

I do

not think the takings clause is offended.

2.

The Indian Allotment Acts.--Finally,

I

address the

peculiar circumstances of the allotment acts to determine whether
those statutes granted the Indians a contractual right beyond the
reach of subsequent governmental alteration.
addressed

takings

challenges

to

The Court has twice

congressional

changes

of

the

12.

terms under which allotments had been given to Indians; although
neither of those cases concerned the Sioux Allotment Act,
establish

the

principles

of

interpretation

that

should

they
govern

this case.
In Choate v. Trapp, 224
the following facts.

u.s.

665 (1912), the Court faced

When Congress allotted parcels to the Choc-

taw and Chickasaw tribes in 1898, it expressly provided "that the
land should be

non-taxable"

for

a

certain period of time.

In

1908, Congress removed the tax exemption provided in the original
allotment act.

The Court held that the Fifth Amendment prevented

Congress from removing the tax exemption.

The Court noted:

Under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment there was
no more power to deprive him of the exemption than of
any other right in the property. No statute would have
been valid which reduced his fee to a life estate, or
attempted to take from him ten acres, or fifty acres,
or the timber growing on the land.
Id., at 674.
Six years later the Court considered a similar case in
Jefferson v. Fink, 247

u.s.

288

(1918).

The Creek allotment act

provided that descent of the allotted parcels would be governed
by Arkansas

law.

In 1908,

after

the Creek

reservation became

part of the state of Oklahoma, Congress provided that future descents

would

be

governed

by Oklahoma

citing Choate, upheld this statute.

law.

The Court,

without

Justice Van Devanter argued:

"What was said about the rules of descent was purely legislative,
not contractual ....
to change

by

the

Like other rules of descent it was subject

law-making

power

as

to any

passed to the heir by the death of the owner."

land

not

already

Id., at 294.

Irving tries to bring her case within the rule of Choate
by arguing that the Sioux bargained for, and received, a contrac-

.l.j.

tual promise that Congress would not
of the parcels.

~estrict

the hereditability

The relevant section of the Sioux Allotment Act

provides:
That upon the approval of the allotments provided for
in this act by the Secretary of the Interior, he shall
cause patents to issue therefor in the name of the allottees, which patents shall ... declare that the United States does and will hold the lands thus allotted
for the period of twenty-five years, in trust for .•.
the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made,
or, in case of his decease, of his heirs according to
the laws of the State or Territory where such land is
located. SAA §11, 25 Stat., at 891 (emphasis added).
As the SG demonstrates, Irving's reading of the legislative

history

is

simply untenable.

First of all,

although

the

Sioux Allotment Act was passed in 1889, the Sioux were not legally capable of disposing of property by will until the Act of June
25,

1910,

§2,

ch.

431,

36 Stat.

Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 613

&

n.4

855,

(1970)

856;

see Tooahnippah v.

(Harlan, J., concurring).

It is difficult to accept an argument that the Sioux Allotment
Act gave the Sioux a contractual right to pass land by will or by
intestate succession, when the Sioux were statutorily prohibited
from disposing of land by will for the two decades immediately
after passage of that act.
Moreover,

the sources of the language in the Sioux Al-

lotment Act demonstrate that Congress did not negotiate with the
Sioux on this point.
ment Act is
Act.

The relevant language in the Sioux Allot-

identical to the language in the General Allotment

Compare General Allotment Act of

1887,

§5,

ch.

119,

24

Stat. 388, 389, with Sioux Allotment Act, §11, ch. 405, 25 Stat.
888, 891.

The changes made between Congress's first offer to the

Sioux, Act of Apr. 30, 1888, ch. 206, 25 Stat. 94, and the Sioux

14.

Allotment Act, have nothing to do with the question in this case.
See S. Exec. Doc. 51, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.

(1890), reprinted in

2682 Serial Set.
In short,

even giving Irving the benefit of the doubt

because of her Indian status, she cannot establish a contractual
right granted by the Sioux Allotment Act; her claim must stand or
fall on the statutory language alone.

The language is not nearly

so clear as the passage that led the Court to find a taking in
Choate.

In fact, I think the change here is completely indistin-

guishable from Pink.

This conclusion is bolstered by the tone of

the Choate opinion,

which reflects an implicit conclusion that

Congress' promise not to tax the parcels was a material part of
the bargain that induced the Indians to accept allotments.
The
statement

best

argument

in Choate

that

in

favor

"[n] o

of

Irving

statute would

is

the Court's

have been valid

which reduced his fee to a life estate, or attempted to take from
him

ten

acres,

or

fifty

land, " 2 2 4 u.S. at 6 7 4.

acres,

or

the

timber growing on the

I do not think this statement controls

this case for three reasons.
statement is clearly dictum.

First, and least persuasively, the
Second, section 207 does not reduce

Irving's interest to a life estate;

it allows her to convey by

inter vivos transfer an interest that extends beyond her death.
On the other hand, considering the lack of business sophistication of the affected Indians, this distinction should not receive
great weight.

Third, and most importantly, Choate itself notes

that the private rights of Indians "are secured and enforced to
the same extent and in the same way as other residents or citi-

.1!) •

zens of the United States."

Id., at ·677.

The Choate Court be-

lieved that the Fifth Amendment takings clause analysis protected
Indians just as much as it protected other citizens.
have concluded above that,
cerns of

Because I

apart from the Indian-specific con-

statutory construction,

the

takings

clause challenge

would fail, I think that Choate should not be interpreted to invalidate section 207.
In my view, there is no taking.

C.

Texaco, Inc. v. Short

The Texaco argument is explicated most fully in
the Brief Amicus Curiae of the Pacific Legal Foundation, but the
case is mentioned i.n the Brief for the Appellees;

I think you

should consider it.
In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982}, the Court
considered an Indiana statute that transferred abandoned mineral
interests to the surface owner.

It applied to any interest that

had not been used for twenty years, unless the owner filed a document within the two-year grace period after passage of the statute.

JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion for the Court rejected the argu-

ment that the mineral interest holders were entitled to specific
notice.

He stated:

It is well established that persons owning property
within a State are charged with knowledge of relevant
statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of such property.
It is also settled that the question whether a
statutory grace period provides an adequate opportunity
for citizens to become familiar with a new law is a

.LOo

matter on which the Court shows the greatest deference
to the judgment of state legislatures.
[W]e cannot conclude that the statute was
so unprecedented and so unlikely to come to the attention of citizens reasonably attentive to the enactment
of laws affecting their rights that this 2-year period
was constitutionally inadequate.
Id., at 532-33.
You joined JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent in Texaco. He argued that the scheme was unconstitutional because "there is no
discernible basis for failing to afford those owners such notice
as would make the saving proviso meaningful."

Id., at 554.

I do not think Texaco requires a holding
207 is unconstitutional,

even though the statute gave no notice

to the owners of the interests to be escheated.
the deference
Congress'

granted

broad

by

powers

that section

Giving Congress

the Texaco majority,

over

Indians and over

dispose of property at death,

I

and

recognizing

their

ability to

assume the Court will conclude

that section 207 is not offensive on this point. (

~ oT

· But even under JUSTICE BRENNAN's approach,

,A.Ut-y

section 207

should withstand scrutiny.

The theory of his dissent just does

not apply to these facts.

The Indiana scheme provided that the
They would survive if

interests were not automatically taken.

the interest owners filed with the state within two years.
state was not seeking to destroy the interests per se,
force owners · to use them. · In JUSTICE BRENNAN's view,
could

not

save

the

constitutionality

of

the

The

just to

the state

statute

from

a

takings challenge by putting in a grace period, but providing so
little notice as to make it practically ineffective.
Section 207 has an entirely different goal:
of the tiny interests.

-

destruction

It provided no grace period during which

the Indians could save their interests; the only way an interest

..L I •

holder can protect his interest is to combine it with other interests to put it beyond the reach of the statute.

In this situ-

ation, where the goal of Congress is the destruction of the interests
Congress

themselves,
has

the

power

. - - ---

-------to consolidate the

--

the sole constitutional question is whether
.

interests;

this

is

judged most effectively under the takings clause.
I do not think section 207 is a taking.
think CA8 should be reversed.
two versions of the statute.
before this court.
original version

If

(as I

Accordingly, I

I close with a few comments on the
The

~ts

to ILCA are not

this Court reverses CA8 and upholds the
have recommended),

the lower courts will

have no doubt that the more generous 1984 version is consti tu~dt.~
tional.
If, however, this Court s-trikQ-8 €!own the original version, it still might reverse CAS's declaration that the 1984 version is unconstitutional.

The 1984 version was not applied to

any of the plaintiff class, so this Court would be free to leave
that for another day.

On the other hand, if the ground of deci-

sion is broad, this Court might include a footnote noting that it
sees no meaningful distinction between the old and new versions
of the statute.
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MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Ronald

Re:

Hodel v. Irving, No. 85-637

I
case.

have

July 28, 1986

just received your memo of

21 July about this

I have already sent you a bench memorandum in this case.

As that memo states, I agree with your tentative conclusion that,
on the facts of this case, the government's actions do not constitute a taking.

On the last page of your memo, you asked your

Clerk to address the validity of the /overnment's position that
the State has plenary authority over the disposition of property
at death.

My memo did not address this question because I felt

that the case could be disposed of under the takings analysis.

2.

Because your memo seems to indicate agreement with this approach,
I thought it was best not to go ahead with further research on
the question of plenary authority.

This is a substantial ques-

tion; in fact my reading thus far leads me to think the government might not prevail on that point.

At least in the context of

allotted lands, Choate posts some limit to governmental power.
If my memo fails to convince you that we need not address the plenary authority question, let me know and I will look
------:::~

into it.
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October 9, 1986

CHAM6ERS OF"

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Dear Chief,
John

Stevens

has

agreed

to

opinion in 85-637, Hodel v. Irving.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

do

the
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CHAM BERS OF"

THE C HI EF .JU STICE

October 20, 1986
RE:

No. 85-637 - Hodel v. Irving

Dear Lewis:
Would you be willing to take on a dissent in this case?

Regards,~

Justice Powell
Copy to Justice Brennan

IJ~ ,tfir.c
J:.U
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~~~~~

October 20, 1986

85-637

Hodel v. Irving

Dear Chief:
I'll be qlad to draft a dissent in this case.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

Justice Brennan

.iU¥rtw <JI~rt a£ t4t ~ittb .italt.e'

Pulfhtgton. ~. QI.

2llt?~~

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

November 3, 1986

No. 85-637

Hodel v. Irving

Dear John,
Your draft opinion in this case goes off on a
ground not raised by the parties - a Due Process ground
resting on the holding of Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 u.s.
516. The effect of your opinion seems to be that the
Due Process Clause requires a grace period of reasonable
length before a state may change the rules of intestate
succession or laws governing disposition by will. Although
you state the holding is limited to the Indian trust
relationship, I do not see how the reaponing can be so
confined. Indeed, Texaco, Inc. v. Short was not an Indian
case. The rationale strikes me as unduly broad and that
it will throw into question a broad range of legislative
changes.
Although .I am still inclined to affirm the
judgment below in part on the basis of the Takings Clause,
I do not think I can join your opinion. I will await
further writing.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens

Copies to the Conference

-

.iltJrttntt <ijourt ctf tlrt ~tb ,i~g
.. as!fingbm. ~. <ij. 2n.;;~~

November 4, 1986

Dear John,
I share Sandra's concerns both about reaching the
due process issue and about the future effects of your
proposed analysis on changes in the law of intestate
succession.
I also remain of the view that §207's
elimination of the right to pass property by will
violates the takings clause, although its change in
what appens to property absent a will does not.
Finally, I think it is possible to find standing here
under a more limited theory that would retain more of
the prudential third-party standing bar.
I intend to try my hand at an opinion along these
lines in the hope of persuading you and the rest of my
colleagues.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

~ovember

5, 1986

85-637 Hodel v. Irving

Dear John:
At Conference I was tentatively inclined to reverse
~A8.

A clear majority at Confe~~nce vote~ to affirm, but
there was considerable diversity of opinion as to the basts
of the Court''3 decision. Letter.:; from Sandra and Nino inlii.cate that differences continue to exist.

As 1 am not at rest, I will await further writinq
before deciding what to do.
Sincerely,

Justice W4MY+ ~
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.l\tqtrtmt <ll~ atf tift 'Jnittb jltalu'

Jlag~ J. <!f. 20.?"'
CHAMBERS OF"

November 6, 19~

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

85-637 - Hodel v. Irving

Dear John,
Please join me.

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

Qfltlttt &tf tlf.t ~nit.tlt ,Statts
._bJrittgtott. ~. Qf. 2ll,?'l~

~mtt

CHAMBf:RS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY('< . BLACKMUN

November 10, 1986

.Re: No. 85-637, Hodel v. Irving
Dear John:
I find myself in somewhat the same position as that
taken by Sandra and Nino in this case. My approach was on
"taking," not "abandonment." The Government, in fact, has
not argued abandonment and, for now, I am hesitant to pursue that path.
I had assumed that the Sioux owners here
actually "use" the property in the sense . of receiving income.
I therefore refrain from joining your opinion at this
time.
I perhaps shall wait to see what Nino has to say in
his separate writing, but it may turn out that I cannot
join him either.
In that event, I shall await further
writing or shall pen a fe~ words myself.
Sincerely,

-----....

Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

rjm 11/14/86

To:
From:
Re:

Justice Powell
Ronald
85-637, Hodel v. Irving

/

You asked for a short dissent of four to five pages.
It was
understanding that you wanted a general statement memorializyour conclusions, rather than a detailed statement attempting
persuade others to go your way.
In print, this should come
to just under five pages.
I decided not to address the merits of the notice question.
The question is not susceptible of simple, brief treatment.
Moreover, although I think we could quickly produce something
that reflects the views you expressed by joining JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion in Texaco, I do not think THE CHIEF JUSTICE would
join such an opinion.
my
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85-637 Hodel v. Irving

Dear Chief 1

This refers to your
still pending.

li~t

of October cases that ar.e

~?hen John's op in ton •..;a s c ircu la ted, 1 ,.,rote h lm on
November 5 - w!th copies to the Conference - saying that I
would await other writing. I am not at rest in this case,
~nd want to see what Nino writes.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

rjm 02/20/87

To:
From:
Re:

JUSTICE PCM ELL
Ronald
No. 85-637, Hodel v. Irving
Apparently,

the Chief's comments at Conference convinced

JUSTICE SCALIA to circulate his opinion in this case.

In Part I,

he explains why the Court of Appeals was correct in rejecting
resps'

claims

that

they

themselves were

deprived of anything.

This part is fine.
In Part II, he explains why he thinks resps have standing to
litigate this claim.

He finds standing,

-

because "the Court of

Appeals effectively made an appointment of a personal representative of the decedents for purposes of this suit, just as a probate court would be required to do where the decedent has failed
to select one."

1st Draft, at 4.

I find thi

?

doubt that you should join it.
Your cases establish a two-part test for third-party standing :<1fner:e must be some relationship between the party asserting
the right and the holder of the right; and there must
be a "genu,
ine obstacle" to assertion of the right.
428 U.S. 106, 112-114 (1976)
MUN) ;

id.,

standard,

at 126

(plurality opinion of JUSTICE BLACK-

opinion)

(suggesting a more rigorous

that "such litigation is in all practicable terms irn-

possible") •
ing.

(your

se r singleton v. Wulff,

In this case, there is standing under either stand-

Because resps'

decedents are dead,

cannot press this claim.

it is clear that they

As you know, your opinions have been

very restrictive on third party standing.
gument that there is no standing here.

You could make an ar-

See Bench Memorandum, at

7

page 2.

6-7 (making such an argument).

If you wish to find standing, I

think you should do so on the traditional grounds outlined above,
'------------------~-----------

rather than the novel grounds outlined by JUSTICE STEVENS (in his
'--··-----

-·-----~

circulating draft) or JUSTICE SCALIA (in this opinion).
Part III of JUSTICE SCALIA's opinion explains why he finds a
taking.

In his view,

there is a taking because the government

has taken the right to pass the property to children.

In his

view, this is such a fundamental right that any interference with
it would be a taking.

He goes on to suggest that compensation is

required in "all cases where the reallocation of property rights
is the

a~knowledged

purpose of the government action."

This case

aside, I doubt you will subscribe to such a broad statement.
It is not clear whether we now are obligated to write.

The

Chief's clerk called to ask what we would do.

I told him that I

expected you would consult with his boss about

this.~

copy of the draft dissent I wrote earlier this fall.
viewed that opinion and do not think it is very good.
require some refurbishing before it could be

attach a

I have reIt would

circulated. ~

ticular, I think we should adapt it to fit in with the circulating opinions in Keystone and First English Evangelical.
I await advice of your further wishes.

~

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Stevens
O'Connor

From:

Justice Scalia

Circulate~: F£8 2 J 1987
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DONALD P.
RIOR,

TARY OF THE INTEARY IRVING ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[February - , 1987]

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring
I do not believe the Court should decide whether § 207 of
the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, 96 Stat. 2517, 25
U. S. C. § 2206, violates the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment-a question not raised or argued at any stage of
this litigation. To strike down an Act of Congress on a
ground that the Secretary has not even had an opportunity to
address displays, in my view, inadequate respect for both the
coordinate branches of government. Conversely, it seems to
me that we should decide the question the parties did brief
and argue both here and below: whether § 207 effects a taking
of property without just compensation, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
I
Appellees contended below that by virtue of the statute
they were themselves deprived of property protected by the
Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals properly rejected
that contention. When the statute was enacted, none of the
members of the Tribe from whom A.ppellees would have received the property by will or intestacy had died. Appellees'
interest in the property was therefore entirely contingent,
since the then-provided disposition could have been altered at
any time by their decedents' making or changing their wills,
see 25 U. S. C. §§ 373, 464 (1982), or by change in the governing law of intestate disposition, see Act of Mar. 2, 1889,

85-637-CONCUR
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ch. 405, § 11, 25 Stat. 888, 891. Enactment of the statute,
therefore, deprived appellees of "a mere unilateral expectation," Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U. S. 155, 161 (1980), that does not constitute a property
right within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Ibid.
See Irving Trust Co . v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1940); Jef- J
ferson v. Fink, 247 U. S. 288, 293-294 (1918).
Appellees attempted to argue that, even though potential
heirs ordinarily do not have a property right, the trust patents given to the Oglala Sioux gave heirs a vested interest.
As the Court of Appeals determined, the language of the
statute providing for the patents will not bear that interpretation. Irving v. Clark , 758 F. 2d 1260, 1265 (CA8 1985).
The Oglala patents were to declare
"that the United States does and will hold the lands thus
allotted . . . in trust for the sole use and benefit of the
Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made, or,
in case of his decease, of his heirs according to the laws
of the State or Territory where such land is located . . .
Provided further, That the law of descent and partition
in force in the State or Territory where the lands may be
situated shall apply thereto .... " Act of Mar. 2, 1889,
ch. 405, § 11, 25 Stat. 888, 891.
That cannot reasonably be interpreted to create vested rights
in any particular heirs, since the heirs are to be determined in
accordance with "the law of descent and partition in force in
the State or Territory where the lands may be situated."
Ibid. See Jefferson v. Fink , supra, at 293-294. Moreover,
as the Court of Appeals noted, vested rights in prospective
heirs are inconsistent with the Oglala Sioux' power to make
wills, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 373, 464, upon the validity of which
the claims of Elaine Bissonette, one of the appellees, are
premised. Irving v. Clark, supra, 758 F. 2d, at 1265.

f
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II

Although before this Court appellees no longer assert that
the Indian Land Consolidation Act violates their own constitutional rights, they do seek to defend the Eighth Circuit's
conclusion that it violates the property rights of their decedents. Before reaching the merits of that claim, it is necessary to determine that appellees have standing to assert the
rights of third parties. 1 I believe that they do, but would
rest that conclusion on narrower grounds than JUSTICE
STEVENS.
For obvious reasons, it has long been recognized that the
surviving claims of a decedent must be pursued by a third
party. As the Court of Appeals stated, if there is a right
protected by the Fifth Amendment to pass property after
death, one feature of that right must be that a claim arising
from its violation survives the testator's death; otherwise,
the right would be nugatory. Irving v. Clark, supra, 758 F.
2d, at 1267.
At common law, a decedent's surviving claims were prosecuted by the executor or administrator of the estate, depending on whether the decedent died testate or intestate. For
Indians with trust property, statutes require the Secretary
of the Interior to assume that general role. 25 U. S. C.
§§ 371-380. The Secretary's responsibilities in that capacity,
however, include the administration of the statute that appellees claim is unconstitutional, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 2201-2210, l
so that he can hardly be expected to assert appellees' decedents' rights to the extent they turn on that point.
Under these circumstances, appellees can appropriately
serve as their decedents' representatives for purposes of asserting the latter's Fifth Amendment rights. They are best
situated to pursue the claims vigorously, since their interest
in receiving the property is indissolubly linked to the dece-

1

1
For the reasons stated by JUSTICE STEVENS, ante, at 7 and n. 10, I
agree that appellees have suffered injury in fact as a result of the statute.

85-637-CONCUR
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dents' right to dispose of it by will or intestacy. See ante, at ('
8. The view that they are the appropriate representatives is
consistent with the Uniform Probate Code (West), which provides that where a testator has failed to select an executor in
his will, or where a decedent has died intestate, devisees and
heirs have priority for appointment as personal representatives of the decedent. § 3-203. In recognizing appellees'
standing to assert their decedents' rights, the Court of Appeals effectively made an appointment of a personal representative of the decedents for purposes of this suit, just as a
probate court would be required to do where the decedent
has failed to select one, or where his selection is defective.
Cf. Tooahnipah v. Hickel, 397 U. S. 598, 600 (1970) (Court \
assumed that where statute provided that a will could be approved by the Secretary of Interior "before or after the death
of the testator," beneficiaries were the appropriate persons
to seek approval of a will after death). Such an appointment )
is a "settled practice of the courts" that is an exception to the
general rule that a litigant cannot raise the rights of third
parties. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179

u. s. 405, 406 (1900).

III
As to the merits of the claims appellees assert on behalf of
their decedents, it should :first be noted that § 207 affected
appellees' decedents' dispositions of their property at death
in two ways. First, it changed the law of intestate succession by providing that the property would no longer descend
by intestacy according to the law of the State where the property was located, but instead would escheat to the Tribe.
Second, it precluded the decedents from having their property descend by will. The combined effect of these restrictions is to deprive appellees' decedents absolutely of all ability to have their property descend even to their children or \
close relatives after their death.
The Secretary suggests (without quite arguing) that a legislature has unlimited power to revise the law of succession,
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since it is of statutory creation. I know of no authority for
that proposition. 2 In several cases we have stated that the
legislative power to regulate succession and testamentary
disposition is very broad. See, e. g., Irving Trust Co. v.
Day, 314 U.S 556, 562 (1942); Magoun v. Illinois Trust &
Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 288-291 (1898); United States
v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 628 (1896); United States v. Fox,
94 U. S. 315, 320-321 (1876); Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U. S. (23
Wall.) 137, 148 (1874); Mager v. Grima, 48 U. S. (8 How.)
490, 492-493 (1850). None of those cases involved Fifth
Amendment claims, however, nor did any involve the rights
of the decedent. Rather they were brought by would-be
heirs or devisees in their own right. Moreover the statutes
considered in those cases did not eliminate heirship completely, but merely altered the identity of the prospective
heirs or imposed inheritance taxes. Nor did they come close
to eliminating entirely the power to direct property by will.
I am confident that in making these statements the Court did
not have in mind the complete elimination of all power to
leave property to one's family; and even if it did, the statements are plainly dicta.
The Secretary argues that since the present case does not
involve physical appropriation or destruction of property, the
2

Its logic, of course-that any right conferred by statute can be withIt has long been established, for example, that statutory land grants cannot be revoked without running afoul of
the constitutional prohibition on impairment of contracts. Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U. S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810). They may be revoked or impaired where the statutory grant has reserved that right. See United
States v. Fuller, 409 U. S. 488 (1973). But there is no basis for finding
such a right of revocation implicit in the statutes giving the Oglala Sioux
the right to pass property to their descendants. Even a statutory tax exemption-a privilege ordinarily assumed to be held at the grace of the legislature-has been held not subject to an implicit right of repeal where (as
here) Indians have given up other claims to obtain it. Choate v. Trapp,
224 U. S. 665 (1912). The right to leave property to one's family at death
is a much more traditional property right, as to which a right of repeal is
even less likely to have been implicitly retained.
drawn by statute-is erroneous.

85-637-CONCUR
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Fifth Amendment question must be decided on the basis of
the "ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" that we conduct when a state
regulates the use of property. Brief for Appellant 30, quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,-- U. S.
- - (1986). I disagree. We have applied the "regulatory
takings" approach to laws that have an incidental effect on
property rights, but whose primary purpose is not to reallocate property. In that context, as the Court explained in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U. S. 104 (1978), it is necessary to determine "whether the
interference with [the claimant's] property is of such magnitude that 'there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain [it]."' Id., at 136, quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon , 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922) (emphasis added).
It would be a dangerous expansion, however, to extend
that approach beyond the incidental effects of the government's exercise of its regulatory powers, to what is substantially the exercise of eminent domain itself-that is, to government action that has as its very purpose the transfer of
property ownership. And that is the situation we confront
here. The present statute does not seek to further the public health, Mugler v. Kansas , '\23 U. S. 623, 668-669 (1887),
preserve historically significant structures, Penn Central,
supra, at 132, or prevent the destruction of a valuable national resource, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 53 (1979).
Rather, as the Secretary explains, its purpose is to create a
new structure of ownership of land interests that Congress
believes will be more beneficial to Indians. Brief for Appellant 9-10. While we held in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229 (1984), that such an objective was a
"public purpose" for which the eminent domain power could
be used, we assuredly did not hold that Congress could pursue it by regulation, instead of through eminent domain. To
the contrary, our holding that the law was constitutional was
expressly conditioned on the "assum[piion] . . . that the
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weighty demand of just compensation has been met." I d., at
Where, as here, Congress has expressly stated that its
objective is to create a new ownership structure for particular property, and where that is the public purpose that the
government invokes to defend the statute in litigation, it
would seem to me extraordinary not to require the eminent
domain power, with its attendant safeguard of compensation,
to be employed. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De
Benedictis, - - U. S. - - (1987) [No. 85-1092, slip op. at
13-20] (the purpose of the action is critical in assessing
whether the government is required to proceed by eminent
domain). Such an approach in no way threatens the government's power to "adjust the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good," Penn Central, supra, at
124, because it does not require the government to "regulate
by purchase," Allard, supra, at 65 (emphases added and
deleted).
In my view, the requirement of proceeding by eminent domain should apply in all cases where the reallocation of property rights is the acknowledged purpose of the government
action, no matter how insignificant those rights may be.
That should at least be the rule, however, where the govern- '
ment abrogates a property right that is as central to ownership as is the power to pass on property after one's death.
Like the power to exclude others involved in Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979), it is a traditionally understood concomitant of ownership. In one form or another,
the right to pass on property-to one's family in particularhas been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times, even when property owners held their land by virtue of the grace of the King. See A. Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the Land Law 54-60, 171 (1961). In
fact, as we have noted, "the general consent of the most enlightened nations has, from the earliest historical period, recognized a natural right in children to inherit the property of
their parents." United States v. P~rkins, supra, at 628.
245.
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The Founding Fathers regarded the right to pass on property as so important that its elimination as a criminal penalty
is proscribed by the Constitution, even as a penalty for treason. See Art. III, sec. 3, cl. 2 ("no Attainder of Treason
shall work Corruption of Blood"). While we have long recognized the legitimacy of many forms of regulation of that
right, its total abrogation withdraws from the owner "one of
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna, supra, at
176.3 Thus, in Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1912), this I
Court said, by way of exemplifying what would constitute a
quintessential taking, that "[n]o statute would have been
valid which reduced [the owner's] fee to a life estate." Id.,
at 674. The statute at issue here does almost precisely
that.4
The Secretary contends that the takings clause may be
avoided because the land goes to the Tribe rather than to the
United States. There is no authority for that proposition.
The fact that appellees may benefit somewhat more from the
land's reversion to the Tribe than they would from its appropriation by the government might, if proven, justify an offset
in determining the level of compensation. But the "reciprocity of advantage" principle of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
The Secretary also argues that appellees have not really been deprived
of their right to transfer property at death, because they can convey the
remainder inter vivos and retain a life estate. That is of course not equivalent to passing property at death, since the inter vivos transfer is effective
immediately and irrevocably, whereas a devisor may change his mind and
revoke his disposition until his death. In any event, the suggested transaction would have to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior, 25 CFR
§ 152.25, who would have ample grounds for disapproving it (indeed, might
be compelled to disapprove it) on the ground that it would frustrate the
policies of the statute at issue here.
' Since the owners of fractionated shares retain a limited right to convey
more than a life estate, see 25 CFR § 152.25, as well as to engage in a few
other complicated transactions that at least in theory may avoid escheat at
their death , see 25 CFR §§ 151.7, 152.33, they have not lost all interest in
the remainder. But that retained interest is negligible.
3
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260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922) and the dissent in Penn Central,
438 U. S., at 140, requires that the burden be spread as
broadly as the benefit, a state of affairs that nobody has contended is present here.
The government's policies on Indian ownership have
shifted with every political and intellectual breeze. One of
the purposes of electing legislatures is to make such shifts
possible, and there is nothing constitutionally suspect about
their occurrence. But if the government's new policy requires the extinction of pre-existing property rights, justice
and fairness require that the costs imposed by that policy be
borne by society at large, and not by appellees. I would
therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling that Section 207
violates the Fifth Amendment. 5

5
I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that the Court of Appeals erred in deciding the constitutionality of the amended statute. Ante, at 14, n.17.

February 26, 1987

85-637, Hodel v. Irving

near Nino,
Althou9h my Conference vote '11as the "other way", I
am persuaded by your fine concurring opini.on. With a fe\t
changes, I think I can join you.

Some of the language in your opinion, particularly
on pages 7 and 8, eppears to be inconsistent \-lith the Chief
Justice's dissent in 85-1092, Keystone Bituminous Coal v.
DeBenedictis. I have joined the Chief Justice in that case.
The issu~s in this case ar~ qufte different from those that
have split the Court i.n l~ycatone.
Sincerely,

Just i.ce Seal ia
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.ju.prmtt Ofourl of tift ~b .jtatt•

Jfasltinghtn. ~. <!f.

21l~,.~

CHAMeERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 3, 1987

Re:

No. 85-637

Hodel v. Irving

Dear Nino,
Although I voted to reverse at Conference, I find the
second draft of your opinion in this case quite persuasive,
and if you could make the change hereafter discussed I will
join it.
You cite John's opinion in Keystone Bituminous on page
7 for the proposition that the purpose of government action
is critical in assessing whether the government is required
to proceed by eminent domain. I have no objection to this,
even though I am in dissent in Keystone. But the following
sentence suggests, at least to me, that there may be a
distinction between a "regulation" which does not involve a
physical taking, even though all beneficial use is denied,
and an outright physical taking. This is a matter on which
the majority opinion and the dissent in Keystone apparently
disagree, and I would prefer to see the lines drawn in that
case rather than this. If you would delete this sentence, I
would be happy to join yo.ur opinion.
Sincerely,
jtl}~

Justice Scalia
cc:

The Conference

..lqlftmt ~cntri

Df tlft ~ittb ..talt.e

,rulfinghnt. ~. ~· 2llc?,.~
CH"MBERS OF

JUSTICE: ANTONIN SCALIA

March 3, 1987

Re:

No. 85-637 - Hodel v. Irving

Dear Chief:
I did not intend to suggest what you feared, and have
no problem whatever in deleting the last sentence of the
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DONALD P. HODEL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, APPELLANT v. MARY IRVING ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT. OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[March -

, 1987]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE POWELL join, concurring.
I do not believe the Court should decide whether § 207 of
the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, 96 Stat. 2517, 25
U. S. C. § 2206, violates the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment-a question not raised or argued at any stage of
this litigation. To strike down an Act of Congress on a
ground that the Secretary has not even had an opportunity to
address displays , in my view, inadequate respect for both-the
coordinate branches of government. Conversely, it seems to
me that we should decide the question the parties did brief
and argue both here and below: whether § 207 effects a taking
of property without just compensation, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
I
Appellees contended below that by virtue of the statute
they were themselves deprived of property protected by the
Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals properly rejected
that contention. When the statute was enacted, none of the
members of the Tribe from whom appellees would have received the property by will or intestacy had died. Appellees'
interest in the property was therefore entirely contingent,
since the then-provided disposition could have been altered at
any time by their decedents' making or changing their wills,
see 25 U. S. C. §§ 373, 464 (1982), or by change in the gov-
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erning law of intestate disposition, see Act of Mar. 2, 1889,
ch. 405, § 11, 25 Stat. 888, 891. Enactment of the statute,
therefore, deprived appellees of "a mere unilateral expectation," Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U. S. 155, 161 (1980), that does not constitute a property
right within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Ibid.
See Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1942);
Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U. S. 288, 293-294 (1918).
Appellees attempted to argue that, even though potential
heirs ordinarily do not have a property right, the trust patents given to the Oglala Sioux gave heirs a vested interest.
As the Court of Appeals determined, the language of the
statute providing for the patents will not bear that interpretation. Irving v. Clark, 758 F. 2d 1260, 1265 (CA8 1985).
The Oglala patents were to declare
"that the United States does and will hold the lands thus
allotted . . . in trust for the sole use and benefit of the
Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made, or,
in case of his decease, of his heirs according to the laws
of the State or Territory where such land is located . . .
Provided further, That the law of descent and partition
in force in the State or Territory where the lands may be
situated shall apply thereto .... " Act of Mar. 2, 1889,
ch. 405, § 11, 25 Stat. 888, 891.
That cannot reasonably be interpreted to create vested rights
in any particular heirs, since the heirs are to be determined in
accordance with "the law of descent and partition in force in
the State or Territory where the lands may be situated."
Ibid. See Jefferson v. Fink, supra, at 293-294. Moreover,
as the Court of Appeals noted, vested rights in prospective
heirs are inconsistent with the Oglala Sioux' power to make
wills, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 373, 464, upon the validity of which
the claims of Elaine Bissonette, one of the appellees, are
premised. Irving v. Clark, supra, 758 F. 2d, at 1265.
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dents' right to dispose of it by will or intestacy. See ante, at
8. The view that they are the appropriate representatives is
consistent with the Uniform Probate Code (West), which provides that where a testator has failed to select an executor in
his will, or where a decedent has died intestate, devisees and
heirs have priority for appointment as personal representatives of the decedent. § 3-203. In recognizing appellees'
standing to assert their decedents' rights, the Court of Appeals effectively made an appointment of a personal representative of the decedents for purposes of this suit, just as a
probate court would be required to do where the decedent
has failed to select one, or where his selection is defective.
Cf. Tooahnipah v. Hickel, 397 U. S. 598, 600 (1970) (Court
assumed that where statute provided that a will could be approved by the Secretary of Interior "before or after the death
of the testator," beneficiaries were the appropriate persons
to seek approval of a will after death). Such an appointment
is a "settled practice of the courts" that is an exception to the
general rule that a ·litigant cannot raise the rights of third
parties. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179

u. s. 405, 406 (1900).

III
As to the merits of the claims appellees assert on behalf of
their decedents, it should first be noted that § 207 affected
appellees' decedents' dispositions of their property at death
in two ways. First, it changed the law of intestate succession by providing that the property would no longer descend
by intestacy according to the law of the State where the property was located, but instead would escheat to the Tribe.
Second, it precluded the decedents from having their property descend by will. The combined effect of these restrictions is to deprive appellees' decedents absolutely of all ability to have their property descend even to their children or
close relatives after their death.
The Secretary suggests (without quite arguing) that a legislature has unlimited power to revise the la.w of succession,
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since it is of statutory creation. I know of no authority for
that proposition. 2 In several cases we have stated that the
legislative power to regulate succession and testamentary
disposition is very broad. See, e. g., Irving Trust Co. v.
Day, supra, 314 U.S., at 562; Magoun v. Illinois Trust &
Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 288-291 (1898); United States
v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 628 (1896); United States v. Fox,
94 U. S. 315, 320-321 (1876); Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U. S. (23
Wall.) 137, 148 (1874); Mager v. Grima, 48 U. S. (8 How.)
490, 492-493 (1850). None of those cases involved Fifth
Amendment claims, however, nor did any involve the rights
of the decedent. Rather they were brought by would-be
heirs or devisees in their own right. Moreover the statutes
considered in those cases did not eliminate heirship completely, but merely altered the identity of the prospective
heirs or imposed inheritance taxes. Nor did they come close
to eliminating entirely the power to direct property by will.
I am confident that in making these statements the Court did
not have in mind the complete elimination of all power to
leave property to one's family; and even if it did, the statements are plainly dicta. 3
2
Its logic, of course-that any right conferred by statute can be withdrawn by statute-is erroneous. It has long been established, for example, that statutory land grants cannot be revoked without running afoul of
the constitutional prohibition on impairment of contracts. Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U. S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810). They may be revoked or impaired where the statutory grant has reserved that right. See United
States v. Fuller, 409 U. S. 488 (1973). But there is no basis for finding
such a right of revocation implicit in the statutes giving the Oglala Sioux
the right to pass property to their descendants. Even a statutory tax
exemption-a privilege ordinarily assumed to be held at the grace of the
legislature-has been held not subject to an implicit right of repeal where
(as here) Indians have given up other claims to obtain it. Choate v.
Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1912). The right to leave property to one's family at
death is a much more traditional property right, as to which a right of repeal is even less likely to have been implicitly retained.
3
In light of the careful distinction of these cases in the last five sen- \
tences, I am perplexed by JUSTICE O'CONNOR's statement that she "cau-'
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The Secretary argues that since the present case does not
involve physical appropriation or destruction of property, the
Fifth Amendment question must be decided on the basis of
the "ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" that we conduct when a state
regulates the use of property. Brief for Appellant 30, quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,-- U. S.
- - (1986). I disagree. We have applied the "regulatory
takings" approach to laws that have an incidental effect on
property rights, but whose primary purpose is not to reallocate property. In that context, as the Court explained in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U. S. 104 (1978), it is necessary to determine "whether the
interference with [the claimant's] property is of such magnitude that 'there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain [it]."' !d., at 136, quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922) (emphasis added).
It would be a ·dangerous expansion, however, to extend
that approach beyond the incidental effects of the government's exercise of its regulatory powers, to what is substantially the exercise of eminent domain itself-that is, to government action that has as its very purpose the transfer of
property ownership. And that is the situation we confront
here. The present statute does not seek to further the public health, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 668-669 (1887),
preserve historically significant structures, Penn Central,
supra, at 132, or prevent the destruction of a valuable national resource, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 53 (1979).
Rather, as the Secretary explains, its purpose is to create a
new structure of ownership of land interests that Congress
believes will be more beneficial to Indians. Brief for Appellant 9-10. While we held in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229 (1984), that such an objective was a
"public purpose" for which the eminent domain power could
[not] join [me] in disa;:;proving" them.

Ante, at - .
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be used, we assuredly did not hold that Congress could pursue it by regulation, instead of through eminent domain. To
the contrary, our holding that the law was constitutional was
expressly conditioned on the "assum[ption] . . . that the
weighty demand of just compensation has been met." I d., at
245. Where, as here, Congress has expressly stated that its
objective is to create a new ownership structure for particular property, and where that is the public purpose that the
government invokes to defend the statute in litigation, it
would seem to me extraordinary not to require the eminent
domain power, with its attendant safeguard of compensation,
to be employed. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De
Benedictis, - - U. S. - - (1987) (the purpose of the action
is critical in assessing whether the government is required to
proceed by eminent domain).
In my view, the requirement of proceeding by eminent domain should apply in all cases where the reallocation of property rights is the acknowledged purpose of the government
action, no matter how insignificant those rights may be.
That should at least be the rule, however, where the government abrogates a property right that is as central to ownership as is the power to pass on property after one's death.
Like the power to exclude others involved in Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979), it is a traditionally understood concomitant of ownership. In one form or another,
the right to pass on property-to one's family in particularhas been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times, even when property owners held their land by virtue of the grace of the King. See A. Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the Land Law 54-60, 171 (1961). In
fact, as we have noted, "the general consent of the most enlightened nations has, from the earliest historical period, recognized a natural right in children to inherit the property of
their parents." United States v. Perkins, supra, at 628.
The Founding Fathers regarded the right to pass on property as so important that its elimination as a criminal penalty

..
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is proscribed by the Constitution, even as a penalty for treason. See Art. III, sec. 3, cl. 2 ("no Attainder of Treason
shall work Corruption of Blood"). While we have long recognized the legitimacy of many forms of regulation of that
right, its total abrogation withdraws from the owner "one of
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna, supra, at
176. 4 Thus, in Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665 (1912), this
Court said, by way of exemplifying what would constitute a
quintess.ential taking, that "[nJo statute would have been
valid which reduced [the owner's] fee to a life estate." !d.,
at 674. The statute at issue here does almost precisely
that. 5
The Secretary contends that the takings clause may be
avoided because the land goes to the Tribe rather than to the
United States. There is no authority for that proposition.
The fact that appellees may benefit somewhat more from the
land's reversion to the Tribe than they would from its appropriation by the government might, if proven, justify an offset
in determining the level of compensation. But the "reciprocity of advantage" principle of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922) and the dissent in Penn Central,
438 U. S., at 140, requires that the burden be spread as
'The Secretary also argues that appellees have not really been deprived
of their right to transfer property at death, because they can convey ..the
remainder inter vivos and retain a life estate. That is of course not equivalent to passing property at death, since the inter vivos transfer is effective
immediately and irrevocably, whereas a devisor may change his mind and
revoke his disposition until his death. In any event, the suggested transaction would have to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior, 25 CFR
§ 152.25, who would have ample grounds for disapproving it (indeed, might
be compelled to disapprove it) on the ground that it would frustrate the
policies of the statute at issue here.
5
Since the owners of fractionated shares retain a limited right to convey
more than a life estate, see 25 CFR § 152.25, as well as to engage in a few
other complicated transactions that at least in theory may avoid escheat at
their death, see 25 CFR §§ 151.7, 152.33, they have not lost all interest in
the remainder. But that retained interest is negligible.
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broadly as the benefit, a state of affairs that nobody has contended is present here.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR criticizes the approach to appellees'
claims advanced here as "creating a novel 'bright-line' rule."
Ante, at - - . I will not remark upon the "bright-line"
. characterization, except to note my regret that it should be
used as a term of reproach-particularly in this field, where
clear rules are in such short supply that we have described
our takings clause jurisprudence as a series of "essentially ad
hoc factual inquiries." Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
supra, at 175. But insofar as novelty is concerned, it seems
to me that JusTICE O'CONNOR's approach exemplifies that
quality better than mine. For while it purports to adhere to
traditional "regulatory taking" analysis, it effectively overrules without mention the unanimous decision of this Court in
Andrus v. Allard, supra. In that case we held that an endangered-species regulatory statute forbidding owners of legally acquired bald or golden eagles or eagle parts from disposing of them by sale was not a sufficient restriction on
property rights to constitute a taking because "appellees retain the right to possess and transport their property, and to
donate or devise the protected birds." 444 U. S., at 66.
Appellees here similarly retain the right to possess their
property, as well as a limited right to transfer it inter vivos
by gift or sale. It seems to me impossible to argue that abrogation of their right to transfer it after death is a greater
interference with property than abrogation of the Allard appellees' right to sell it during life, or that the former right is
constitutionally more significant than the latter. If Allard is
to be overruled, it should not be done sub silentio, nor do I
think it necessary to confront that question in the present
case. The approach I have taken distinguishes Allard on the
basis that, while the right there at issue was equivalently important, it was eliminated to effectuate environmental regulation, and not (as here) for the avowed purpose of transferring the property to someone else.

J
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The government's policies on Indian ownership have
shifted with every political and intellectual breeze. One of
the purposes of electing legislatures is to make such shifts
possible, and there is nothing constitutionally suspect about
their occurrence. But if the government's new policy requires the extinction of pre-existing property rights, justice
and fairness require that the costs imposed by that policy be
borne by society at large, and not by appellees. I would
therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling that Section 207
violates the Fifth Amendment. 6

6

I agree with JuSTICE STEVENS that the Court of Appeals erred in
deciding the constitutionality of the amended statute. Ante, at 14, n. 17.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[April - , 1987]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the original version
of the "escheat" provision of the Indian Land Consolidation
Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-459, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519, effected
a "taking" of appellees' decedents' property without just
compensation.
I
Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a
series of land Acts which divided the communal reservations
of Indian tribes into individual allotments for Indians and
unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. This legislation
seems to have been in part animated by a desire to force Indians to abandon their nomadic ways in order to "speed the Indians' assimilation into American society," Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U. S. 463, 466 (1984), and in part a result of pressure to
free new lands for further white settlement. Ibid. Two
years after the enactment of the General Allotment Act of
1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 et seq., Congress adopted a specific
statute authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of
the Sioux Nation into separate reservations and the allotment of specific tracts of reservation land to individual
Indians, conditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the
adult male Sioux. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888
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et seq. Under the Act, each male Sioux head of household
took 320 acres of land and most other individuals 160 acres.
25 Stat. 890. In order to protect the allottees from the
improvident disposition of their lands to white settlers, the
Sioux allotment statute provided that the allotted lands were
to be held in trust by the United States. 25 Stat. 891.
Until 1910 the lands of deceased allottees passed to their
heirs "according to the laws of the State or Territory" where
the land was located, ibid, and after 1910, allottees were
permitted to dispose of their interests by will in accordance
with regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U. S. C. § 373. Those regulations generally served
to protect Indian ownership of the allotted lands.
The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved disastrous for the Indians. Cash generated by land sales to
whites was quickly dissipated and the Indians, rather than
farm the land themselves, evolved into petty landlords, leasing their allotted lands to white ranchers and farmers and living off the meager rentals. Lawson, Heirship: The Indian
Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 Before
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess., 82-83 (1984). The failure of the allotment program
became even clearer as successive generations came to hold
the allotted lands. Forty, eighty and 160 acre parcels became splintered into multiple undivided interests in land,
with some parcels having hundreds and many parcels having
dozens of owners. Because the land was held in trust and
often could not be alienated or partitioned the fractionation
problem grew and grew over time.
A 1928 report commissioned by the Congress found the
situation administratively unworkable and economically
wasteful. L. Meriam, Institute for Government Research,
The Problem of Indian Administration 40-41 (1928). Good,
potentially productive, land was allowed to lie fallow, amidst
great poverty, because of the difficulties of managing property held in this manner. Hearings on H. R. 11113 Before

85-637-0PINION
HODEL v. IRVING

3

the House Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1966) (remarks of Rep. Aspinall). In discussing the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, Representative Howard said:

"It is in the case of the inherited allotments, however,
that the administrative costs become incredible ....
On allotted reservations, numerous cases exist where
the shares of each individual heir from lease money may
be 1 cent a month. Or one heir may own minute fractional shares in 30 or 40 different allotments. The cost
of leasing, bookkeeping, and distributing the proceeds in
many cases far exceeds the total income. The Indians
and the Indian Service personnel are thus trapped in a
meaningless system of minute partition in which all
thought of the possible use of land to satisfy human
needs is lost in a mathematical haze of bookkeeping."
78 Cong. Rec. 11728 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Howard).
In 1934, in response to arguments such as these, the Congress acknowledged the failure of its policy and ended further
allotment of Indian lands. Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461.
But the end of future allotment by itself could not prevent
the further compounding of the existing problem caused by
the passage of time. Ownership continued to fragment as
succeeding generations came to hold the property, since, in
the order of things, each property owner was apt to have
more than one heir. In 1960, both the House and the Senate
undertook comprehensive studies of the problem. See
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., Indian Heirship Land Survey (Comm. Print 1960);
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess., Indian Heirship Land Survey (Comm. Print 1960).
These studies indicated that one-half of the approximately 12
million acres of allotted trust lands were held in fractionated
ownership, with over 3 million acres held by more than six

.
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heirs to a parcel. I d., at x (Part 2). Further hearings were
held in 1966, Indian Fractionated Land Problems: Hearings
on H. R. 11113 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966), but not until Indian Land Consolidation Act
of 1983 did the Congress take action to ameliorate the problem of fractionated ownership of Indian lands.
Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act-the
escheat provision at issue in this case-provided:
"No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust
or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent
[sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe
if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the
total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner
less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to
escheat." 96 Stat. 2519.
Congress made no provision for the payment of compensation
to the owners of the interests covered by § 207. The statute
was signed into law on January 12, 1983 and became effective
immediately.
The three appellees-Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed,
and Eileen Bisonette-are enrolled members of the Oglala
Sioux Tribe. They are, or represent, heirs or devisees of
members of the Tribe who died in March, April and June
1983. Eileen Bisonette's decedent, Mary Poor Bear-Little
Hoop Cross, purported to will all her property, including
property subject to§ 207, to her five minor children in whose
name Bisonette claims the property. Chester Irving,
Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed all
died intestate. At the time of their deaths, the four decedents owned 41 fractional interests subject to the provisions
of§ 207. App. 20, 22-28, 32-33, 37-39. The Irving estate
lost two interests whose value together was approximately
$100; the Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total values of ap-
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proximately $2,700 on the 26 escheatable interests in the
Cross estate and $1,816 on the 13 escheatable interests in the
Pumpkin Seed estates. But for § 207, this property would
have passed, in the ordinary course, to appellees or those
they represent.
Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of South Dakota, claiming that § 207 resulted in a
taking of property without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. The District Court concluded that
the statute was constitutional. It held that appellees had no
vested interest in the property of the decedents prior to their
deaths and that Congress had plenary authority to abolish
the power of testamentary disposition of Indian property and
to alter the rules of intestate succession. App. to Juris.
Statement 21a-26a.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
758 F. 2d 1260. Although it agreed that the appellees had no
vested rights in the decedents' property, it concluded that
their decedents had a right, derived from the original Sioux
Allotment Statute, to control disposition of their property at
death. The Court of Appeals held that the appellees had
standing to invoke that right and that the taking of that right
without compensation to decedents' estates violated the Fifth
Amendment.*
II
The Court of Appeals concluded that appellees have
standing to challenge §207. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. The
Government does not contest this ruling. As the Court of
Appeals recognized, however, the existence of a case or con*The Court of Appeals, without explanation, went on to "declare" that
not only the original version of§ 207, but also the amended version not before it, 25 U. S. C. § 2206, unconstitutionally took property without compensation. Since none of the property which escheated in this case did so
pursuant to the amended version of the statute, this "declaration" is, at
best, dicta. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of § 207 as
amended.
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troversy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's
deliberations. I d., at 1267 n. 12. We are satisfied that the
necessary case or controversy exists in this case. Section
207 has deprived appellees of the fractional interests they
otherwise would have inherited. This is sufficient injury-infact to satisfy Article III of the Constitution. See Singleton
v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976).
In addition to the constitutional standing requirements, we
have recognized prudential standing limitations. As the
court below recognized, one of these prudential principles is
that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. That general principle, however, is subject to exceptions. Appellees here do
not assert that their own property rights have been taken unconstitutionally, but rather that their decedents' right to pass
the property at death has been taken. Nevertheless, we
have no difficulty in finding the concerns of the prudential
standing doctrine met here.
For obvious reasons, it has long been recognized that the
surviving claims of a decedent must be pursued by a third
party. At common law, a decedent's surviving claims were
prosecuted by the executor or administrator of the estate.
For Indians with trust property, statutes require the Secretary of the Interior to assume that general role. 25 U. S. C.
§§371-380. The Secretary's responsibilities in that capacity,
however, include the administration of the statute that the
appellees claim is unconstitutional, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 2202,
2209, so that he can hardly be expected to assert appellees'
decedents' rights to the extent that they turn on that point.
Under these circumstances, appellees can appropriately
serve as their decedents' representatives for purposes of asserting the latters' Fifth Amendment rights. They are situated to pursue the claims vigorously, since their interest in
receiving the property is indissolubly linked to the decedents'
right to dispoRe of it by will or intestacy. A vindication of
decedents' rights would ensure that the fractional interests
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pass to appellees; pressing these rights unsuccessfully would
equally guarantee that appellees take nothing. In short,
permitting appellees to raise their decedents' claims is
merely an extension of the common law's provision for appointment of a decedent's representative. It is therefore a
"settled practice of the courts" not open to objection on the
ground that it permits a litigant to raise third parties' rights.
Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405,
406 (1900).
III
The Congress, acting pursuant to its broad authority to
regulate the descent and devise of Indian trust lands, Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U. S. 288, 294 (1918), enacted § 207 as a
means of ameliorating, over time, the problem of extreme
fractionation of certain Indian lands. By forbidding the
passing on at death of small, undivided interests in Indian
lands, Congress hoped that future generations of Indians
would be able to make more productive use of the Indians'
ancestral lands. We agree with the Government that encouraging the consolidation of Indian lands is a public purpose of high order. The fractionation problem on Indian reservations is extraordinary and may call for dramatic action to
encourage consolidation. The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux
Tribe, appearing as amicus curiae in support of the United
States, is a quintessential victim of fractionation. Forty
acre tracts on the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse reservation, leasing for about $1000 annually, are commonly
subdivided into hundreds of undivided interests, many of
which generate only pennies a year in rent. The average
tract has 196 owners and the average owner undivided interests in fourteen tracts. The administrative headache this
represents can be fathomed by examining Tract 1305, dubbed
"one of the most fractionated parcels of land in the world."
Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing
on S. 2480 and S. 2663 BeforP the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 85 (1984). Tract
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1305 is forty acres and produces $1080 in income annually.
It is valued at $8,000. It has 439 owners, one-third of whom
receive less than $.05 in annual rent and two-third of whom
receive less than $1. The largest interest holder receives
$82.85 annually.
The common denominator used to compute fractional interests in the property is 3,394,923,840,000.
The smallest heir receives $.01 every 177 years. If the tract
were sold (assuming the 439 owners could agree) for its estimated $8,000 value, he would be entitled to $.000418. The

administrative costs of handling this tract are estimated by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $17,560 annually. !d., at 86,
87. See also Comment, Too Little Land, Too Many HeirsThe Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 709,
711-713 (1971).
This Court has held that the government has considerable
latitude in 1regulating property right~ in ways that may adverse y affect e o ners.
ee eystone Bituminous Coal
Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. - - , - - - - - (1987);
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U. S. 104, 125-127 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S.
590, 592-593 U962). The 1~ewomfor examining the question of whether a regulatio of property amounts to a taking
requiring just compensation is firmly established and has
been regularly and recently reaffirmed. See, e. g., tlCeystone
.[Jituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S., at--;
-/Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1004-1005
(1984)~odel v. Virginia Surface Mini'!)~.! and Reclamation
Assn., Inc., 4~2 U. S. 264, g95 (1981); 'Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U. S. 255, 260-261 (1980);'1tg.iser Aetna v. United States, 444
U. S. 164, 174-175 (1979)rf'enn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, 438 U, S., at 124. As THE CHIEF JusTICE has written:
"[T]his Court has generally 'been unable to develop any
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than re-
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main disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.'
[Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U. S. 104], at 124. Rather, it has examined the
'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual i~iries that have identified several f ors-such
as th~opo~ imyact of the regu ation, it terference
wi
reasonable mvestment backed expectations, and
th
arac er of t e government ac Ion-that have particular significance. Ibid." Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U. S., at 175.
There is no question that the relative economic impact of
§ 207 upon the owners of. these property rights can be substantial. Section 207 provides for the escheat of small undivided property interests that are- unproductive during the
year preceding the owner's death. Even if we accept the
Government's assertion that the income generated by such
parcels may be properly thought of as de minimis, their
value may not be. While the Irving estate lost two interests
whose value together was only approximately $100, the Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total values of approximately
$2,700 and $1,816 on the escheatable interests in the Cross
and Pumpkin Seed estates. See App. 20, 21-28, 29-39.
These are not trivial sums. There are suggestions in the legislative history regarding the 1984 amendments to § 207 that
the failure to "look back" more than one year at the income
generated by the property had caused the escheat of potentially valuable timber and mineral interests. S. Rep.
No. 98-632, p. 12 (1984); Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 Before
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess., 20, 26, 32, 75 (1984); Amendments to the Indian
Land Consolidation Act: Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 Before
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 8, 29 (1983). Of course, the whole of appellees' decedents' property interests were not taken by§ 207. Appellees' decedents retained full beneficial use of the property
during their lifetimes as well as the right to convey it inter

./
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vivos. There is no question, however, that the right to pass
on valuable property to one's heirs is itself a valuable right.
Depending on the age of the owner, much or most of the
value of the parcel may inhere in this "remainder" interest.
See 26 CFR § 20.2031-7(f) (Table A) (1986) (value of remainder interest when life tenant is age 65 is approximately 32%
of the whole).
The extent to which any of the appellees had "investmentbacked expectations" in passing on the property is dubious.
Though it is conceivable that some of these interests were
purchased with the expectation that the owners might pass
on the remainder to their heirs at death, the property has
been held in trust for the Indians for 100 years and is overwhelmingly acquired by gift, descent, or devise. Because of
the highly fractionated ownership, the property is generally
held for lease rather than improved and used by the owners.
None of the appellees here can point to any specific investment-backed expectations beyond the fact that their ancestors agreed to accept allotment only after ceding to
the United States large parts of the original Great Sioux
Reservation.
Also weighing weakly in favor of the statute is the fact that
there is something of an "average reciprocity of advantage,"
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922),
to the extent that owners of escheatable interests maintain a
nexus to the Tribe. Consolidation of Indian lands in the
Tribe benefits the members of the Tribe. All members do
not own escheatable interests, nor do all owners belong to the
Tribe. Nevertheless, there is substantial overlap between
the two groups. The owners of escheatable interests often
benefit from the escheat of others' fractional interests.
Moreover, the whole benefit gained is greater than the sum
of the burdens imposed since consolidated lands are more
productive than fractionated lands.
If we were to stop our analysis at this point, we might well
find § 207 constitutional. But the character of the Govern-
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ment regulation here is extraordinary. In Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U. S., at 176, we emphasized that the
regulation destroyed "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude others." Similarly, the regulation
here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass
on a certain type of property-the small undivided interestto one's heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass on
property-to one's family in particular-has been part of the
Anglo-American legal system since feudal times. See
United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 627-628 (1896).
The fact that it may be possible for the owners of these interests to effectively control disposition · upon death through
complex inter vivos transactions such as revocable trusts, is
simply not an adequate substitute for the rights taken given
the nature of the property. Even the United States concedes that total abrogation of the right to pass property is unprecedented and likely unconstitutional. Tr. of Oral Arg.
12-14. Moreover, this statute effectively abolishes both descent and devise of these property interests even when the
passing of the property to the heir might result in consolidation of property-as for instance when the heir already owns
another undivided interest in the property. Compare 25
U. S.C. §2206(b) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Since the escheatable interests are not, as the United States argues, necessarily de minimis, nor, as it also argues, does the availability of
inter vivos transfer obviate the need for descent and devise, a
total
·
se rights cannot be upheld .
. ____
Allar , 444 U. S. 51 (1979), this Court did
'-'--...1-7'..,___
uphold aga st a aking" claim a re~l~ion prohibiting the
sale of eagles and eagle parts, whether legally acquired or
otherwise, in order to conserve the dwindling populations of
these birds. To be sure, in t e bundle of rights that make up
ownership, the right of sale is of comparable importance to
the right to have the property pass on death. As in Allard,
appellees' decedents here retained the right to possess, use,
~

,,
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exclude and donate the property, id., at 66; the extent of
what is taken here in comparison to the rights left untouched
is similar. But Allard depends at least in part on the unique
characteristics of the property at issue in that case. Prohibition of the sale of existing legally obtained artifacts was
nece~~~ inc~ntiv~to poach since "there is no
sure means by which to determine the age of bird feathers;
feathers recently taken can easily be passed off as having
been obtained long ago." Id., at 58. Moreover, the payment of just compensation was not an available alternative in
Allard; owners of illegally obtained feathers may have been
happy to tender them to the government in return for compensation. Poaching, therefore, might have remained profitable absent an uncompensated prohibition against sale.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the Government accomplished its objective in this case by reallocating prop~y
rights in the land and concentrating ownership in the Tribe.
By ~e Act in Allard prevented the sale of property
but did not otherwise reallocate the owners' rights. For all
these reasons, then, Allard does not control the disposition of
-.-""
- ...._, =this case.
In holding that complete abolition of both the descent and
devise of a particular class of property may be a taking, we
reaffirm the continuing vitality of the long line of cases
recognizing the States', and where appropriate, the United
States', broad authority to adjust the rules governing the
descent and devise of property without implicating the guarantees of the Just Compensation Clause. See, e. g., Irving
Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1942); Jefferson v.
Fink, 247 U. S., at 294. The difference in this case is the
fact that both descent and devise are completely abolished;
indeed they are abolished even in circumstances when the
governmental purpose sought to be advanced, consolidation
of ownership of Indian lands, does not conflict with the
further descent of the property.
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There is little doubt that the extreme fractionation of Indian lands is a serious public problem. It may well be appropriate for the United States to ameliorate fractionation by
means of regulating the descent and devise of Indian lands.
Surely it is permissible for the United States to prevent the
owners of such interests from further subdividing them
among future heirs on pain of escheat. See Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 454 U. S. 516, 542 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
It may be appropriate to minimize further compounding of
the problem by abolishing the descent of such interests by
rules of intestacy, thereby forcing the owners to formally
designate an heir to prevent escheat to the Tribe. What is
certainly not appropriate is to take the extraordinary step of
abolishing both descent and devise of these property interests even when the passing of the property to the heir might
result in consolidation of property. Accordingly, we find
that this regulation, in the words of Justice Holmes, "goes
too far." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S., at
415. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-637

DONALD P. HODEL, SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR, APPELLANT v.
MARY IRVING ET AL. .
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1987]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the original version
of the "escheat" provision of the Indian Land Consolidation
Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-459, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519, effected
a "taking" of appellees' decedents' property without just
compensation.
I
Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a
series of land Acts which divided the communal reservations
of Indian tribes into individual allotments for Indians and
unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. This legislation
seems to have been in part animated by a desire to force Indians to abandon their nomadic ways in order to "speed the Indians' assimilation into American society," Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U. S. 463, 466 (1984), and in part a result of pressure to
free new lands for further white settlement. Ibid. Two
years after the enactment of the General Allotment Act of
1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 et seq., Congress adopted a specific
statute authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of
the Sioux Nation into separate reservations and the allotment of specific tracts of reservation land to individual
Indians, conditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the
adult male Sioux. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888
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et seq. Under the Act, each male Sioux head of household
took 320 acres of land and most other individuals 160 acres.
25 Stat. 890. In order to protect the allottees from the
improvident disposition of their lands to white settlers, the
Sioux allotment statute provided that the allotted lands were
to be held in trust by the United States. 25 Stat. 891.
Until 1910 the lands of deceased allottees passed to their
heirs "according to the laws of the State or Territory" where
the land was located, ibid, and after 1910, allottees were
permitted to dispose of their interests by will in accordance
with regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U. S. C. § 373. Those regulations generally served
to protect Indian ownership of the allotted lands.
The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved disastrous for the Indians. Cash generated by land sales to
whites was quickly dissipated and the Indians, rather than
farm the land themselves, evolved into petty landlords, leasing their allotted lands to white ranchers and farmers and living off the meager rentals. Lawson, Heirship: The Indian
Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 Before
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Gong.,
2d Sess., 82-83 (1984). The failure of the allotment program
became even clearer as successive generations came to hold
the allotted lands. Forty, eighty and 160 acre parcels became splintered into multiple undivided interests in land,
with some parcels having hundreds and many parcels having
dozens of owners. Because the land was held in trust and
often could not be alienated or partitioned the fractionation
problem grew and grew over time.
A 1928 report commissioned by the Congress found the
situation administratively unworkable and economically
wasteful. L. Meriam, Ins~itute for Government Research,
The Problem of Indian Administration 40-41 (1928). Good,
potentially productive, land was allowed to lie fallow, amidst
great poverty, because of the difficulties of managing property held in this manner. Hearings on H. R. 11113 Before

85-637-0PINION
HODEL v. IRVING

3

the House Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1966) (remarks of Rep. Aspinall). In discussing the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, Representative Howard said:
"It is in the case of the inherited allotments, however,
that the administrative costs become incredible ....
On allotted reservations, numerous cases exist where
the shares of each individual heir from lease money may
be 1 cent a month. Or one heir may own minute fractional shares in 30 or 40 different allotments. The cost
of leasing, bookkeeping, and distributing the proceeds in
many cases far exceeds the total income. The Indians
and the Indian Service personnel are thus trapped in a
meaningless system of minute partition in which all
thought of the possible use of land to satisfy human
needs is lost in a mathematical haze of bookkeeping."
78 Cong. Rec. 11728 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Howard).
In 1934, in response to arguments such as these, the Congress acknowledged the failure of its policy and ended further
allotment of Indian lands. Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461.
But the end of future allotment by itself could not prevent
the further compounding of the existing problem caused by
the passage of time. Ownership continued to fragment as
succeeding generations came to hold the property, since, in
the order of things, each property owner was apt to have
more than one heir. In 1960, both the House and the Senate
undertook comprehensive studies of the problem. See
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., Indian Heirship Land Survey (Comm. Print 1960);
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess., Indian Heirship Land Survey (Comm. Print 1960).
These studies indicated that one-half of the approximately 12
million acres of allotted trust lands were held in fractionated
ownership, with over 3 million acres held by more than six
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heirs to a parcel. I d., at x (Part 2). Further hearings were
held in 1966, Indian Fractionated Land Problems: Hearings
on H. R. 11113 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966), but not until Indian Land Consolidation Act
of 1983 did the Congress take action to ameliorate the prob- ·
lem of fractionated ownership of Indian lands.
Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act-the
escheat provision at issue in this case-provided:
"No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust
or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent
[sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe
if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the
total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner
less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to
escheat." 96 Stat. 2519.
Congress made no provision for the payment of compensation
to the owners of the interests covered by § 207. The statute
was signed into law on January 12, 1983 and became effective
immediately.
The three appellees-Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed,
and Eileen Bisonette-are enrolled members of the Oglala
Sioux Tribe. They are, or represent, heirs or devisees of
members of the Tribe who died in March, April and June
1983. Eileen Bisonette's decedent, Mary Poor Bear-Little
Hoop Cross, purported to will all her property, including
property subject to § 207, to her five minor children in whose
Chester Irving,
name Bisonette claims the property.
Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed all
died intestate. At the time of their deaths, the four dece~
-dents owned 41 fractional interests subject to the provisions
of § 207. App. 20, 22-28, 32-33, 37-39. The Irving estate
lost two interests whose value together was approximately
$100; the Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total values of ap-
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proximately $2,700 on the 26 escheatable interests in the
Cross estate and $1,816 on the 13 escheatable interests in the
Pumpkin Seed estates. But for § 207, this property would
have passed, in the ordinary course, to appellees or those
they represent.
Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of South Dakota, claiming that § 207 resulted in a
taking of property without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. The District Court concluded that
the statute was constitutional. It held that appellees had no
vested interest in the property of the decedents prior to their
deaths and that Congress had plenary authority to abolish
the power of testamentary disposition of Indian property and
to alter the rules of intestate succession. App. to Juris.
Statement 21a-26a.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
758 F. 2d 1260. Although it agreed that the appellees had no
vested rights in the decedents' property, it concluded that
their decedents had a right, derived from the original Sioux
Allotment Statute, to control disposition of their property at
death. The Court of Appeals held that the appellees had
standing to invoke that right and that the taking of that right
without compensation to decedents' estates violated the Fifth
Amendment. 1
II
The Court of Appeals concluded that appellees have
standing to challenge §207. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. The
Government does not contest this ruling. As the Court of
Appeals recognized, however, the existence of a case or con'The Court of Appeals, without explanation, went on to "declare" that
not only the original version of§ 207, but also the amended version not before it, 25 U. S. C. § 2206, unconstitutionally took property without compensation. Since none of the property which escheated in this case did so
pursuant to the amended version of the statute, this "declaration" is, at
best, dicta. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of § 207 as
amended.
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troversy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's
deliberations. I d., at 1267 n. 12. We are satisfied that the
necessary case or controversy exists in this case. Section
207 has deprived appellees of the fractional interests they
otherwise would have inherited. This is sufficient injury-infact to satisfy Article III of the Constitution. See Singleton
v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976).
In addition to the constitutional standing requirements, we
have recognized prudential standing limitations. As the
court below recognized, one of these prudential principles is
that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. That general principle, however, is subject to exceptions. Appellees here do
not assert that their own property rights have been taken unconstitutionally, but rather that their decedents' right to pass
the property at death has been taken. Nevertheless, we
have no difficulty in finding the concerns of the prudential
standing doctrine met here.
For obvious reasons, it has long been recognized that the
surviving claims of a decedent must be pursued by a third
party. At common law, a decedent's surviving claims were
prosecuted by the executor or administrator of the estate.
For Indians with trust property, statutes require the Secretary of the Interior to assume that general role. 25 U. S. C.
§§ 371-380. The Secretary's responsibilities in that capacity,
however, include the administration of the statute that the
appellees claim is unconstitutional, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 2202,
2209, so that he can hardly be expected to assert appellees'
decedents' rights to the extent that they turn on that point.
Under these circumstances, appellees can appropriately
serve as their decedents' representatives for purposes of asserting the latters' Fifth Amendment rights. They are situated to pursue the claims vigorously, since their interest in
receiving the property is indissolubly linked to the decedents'
right to dispose of it by will or intestacy. A vindication of
decedents' rights would ensure that the fractional interests
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pass to appellees; pressing these rights unsuccessfully would
equally guarantee that appellees take nothing. In short,
permitting appellees to raise their decedents' claims is
merely an extension of the common law's provision for appointment of a decedent's representative. It is therefore a
"settled practice of the courts" not open to objection on the
ground that it permits a litigant to raise third parties' rights.
Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405,
406 (1900).
III
The Congress, acting pursuant to its broad authority to
regulate the descent and devise of Indian trust lands, Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U. S. 288, 294 (1918), enacted § 207 as a
means of ameliorating, over time, the problem of extreme
fractionation of certain Indian lands. By forbidding the
passing on at death of small, undivided interests in Indian
lands, Congress hoped that future generations of Indians
would be able to make more productive use of the Indians'
ancestral lands. We agree with the Government that encouraging the consolidation of Indian lands is a public purpose of high order. The fractionation problem on Indian
reservations is extraordinary and may call for dramatic action to encourage consolidation. The Sisseton-Wahpeton
Sioux Tribe, appearing as amicus curiae in support of the
United States, is a quintessential victim of fractionation.
Forty acre tracts on the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse
reservation, leasing for about $1000 annually, are commonly
subdivided into hundreds of undivided interests, many of
which generate only pennies a year in rent. The average
tract has 196 owners and the average owner undivided interests in fourteen tracts. The administrative headache this
represents can be fathomed by examining Tract 1305, dubbed
"one of the most fractionated parcels of land in the world."
Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing
on S. 2480 and S. 2663 Before the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 85 (1984). Tract
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1305 is forty acres and produces $1080 in income annually.
It is valued at $8,000. It has 439 owners, one-third of whom
receive less than $.05 in annual rent and two-third of whom
receive less than $1. The largest interest holder receives
$82.85 annually.
The common denominator used to compute fractional interests in the property is 3,394,923,840,000.
The smallest heir receives $. 01 every 177 years. If the tract
were sold (assuming the 439 owners could agree) for its estimated $8,000 value, he would be entitled to $.000418. The
administrative costs of handling this tract are estimated by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $17,560 annually. !d., at 86,
87. See also Comment, Too Little Land, Too Many HeirsThe Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 709,
711-713 (1971).
This Court has held that the government has considerable
latitude in regulating property rights in ways that may adversely affect the owners. See Keystone Bituminous Coal
Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. 8. - - , - - - - - (1987);
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U. S. 104, 125-127 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. 8.
590, 592-593 (1962). The framework for examining the question of whether a regulation of property amounts to a taking
requiring just compensation is firmly established and has
been regularly and recently reaffirmed. See, e. g., Keystone
Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S., at--;
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1004-1005
(1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 295 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U. S. 255, 260-261 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U. S. 164, 174-175 (1979); Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, 438 U. S., at 124. As THE CHIEF JusTICE has written:

"[T]his Court has generally 'been unable to develop any
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than re-
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main disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.'
[Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U. S. 104], at 124. Rather, it has examined the
'taking' question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors-such
as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference
with reasonable investment backed expectations, and
the character of the government action-that have particular significance. Ibid." Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U. S., at 175.
There is no question that the relative economic impact of
§ 207 upon the owners of these property rights can be substantial. Section 207 provides for the escheat of small undivided property interests that are unproductive during the
year preceding the owner's death. Even if we accept the
Government's assertion that the income generated by such
parcels may be properly thought of as de minimis, their
value may not be. While the Irving estate lost two interests
whose value together was only approximately $100, the Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total values of approximately
$2,700 and $1,816 on the escheatable interests in the Cross
and Pumpkin Seed estates. See App. 20, 21-28, 29-39.
These are not trivial sums. There are suggestions in the legislative history regarding the 1984 amendments to § 207 that
the failure to "look back" more than one year at the income
generated by the property had caused the escheat of potentially valuable timber and mineral interests. S. Rep.
No. 98-632, p. 12 (1984); Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 Before
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess., 20, 26, 32, 75 (1984); Amendments to the Indian
Land Consolidation Act: Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 Before
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 8, 29 (1983). Of course, the whole of appellees' decedents' property interests were not taken by§ 207. Appellees' decedents retained full beneficial use of the property
during their lifetimes as well as the right to convey it inter
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vivos. There is no question, however, that the right to pass
on valuable property to one's heirs is itself a valuable right.
Depending on the age of the owner, much or most of the
value of the parcel may inhere in this "remainder" interest.
See 26 CFR § 20.2031-7(0 (Table A) (1986) (value of remainder interest when life tenant is age 65 is approximately 32%
of the whole).
The extent to which any of the appellees had "investmentbacked expectations" in passing on the property is dubious.
Though it is conceivable that some of these interests were
purchased with the expectation that the owners might pass
on the remainder to their heirs at death, the property has
been held in trust for the Indians for 100 years and is overwhelmingly acquired by gift, descent, or devise. Because of
the highly fractionated ownership, the property is generally
held for lease rather than improved and used by the owners.
None of the appellees here can point to any specific investment-backed expectations beyond the fact that their ancestors agreed to accept allotment only after ceding to
the United States large parts of the original Great Sioux
Reservation.
Also weighing weakly in favor of the statute is the fact that
there is something of an "average reciprocity of advantage,"
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922),
to the extent that owners of escheatable interests maintain a
nexus to the Tribe. Consolidation of Indian lands in the
Tribe benefits the members of the Tribe. All members do
not own escheatable interests, nor do all owners belong to the
Tribe. Nevertheless, there is substantial overlap between
the two groups. The owners of escheatable interests often
benefit from the escheat of others' fractional interests.
Moreover, the whole benefit gained is greater than the sum
of the burdens imposed since consolidated lands are more
productive than fractionated lands.
If we were to stop our analysis at this point, we might well
find § 207 constitutional. But the character of the Govern-
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ment regulation here is extraordinary. In Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U. S., at 176, we emphasized that the
regulation destroyed "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude others." Similarly, the regulation
here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass
on a certain type of property-the small undivided interestto one's heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass on
property-to one's family in particular-has been part of the
Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.
See
United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 627-628 (1896).
The fact that it may be possible for the owners of these interests to effectively control disposition upon death through
complex inter vivos transactions such as revocable trusts, is
simply not an adequate substitute for the rights taken given
the nature of the property. Even the United States concedes that total abrogation of the right to pass property is unprecedented and likely unconstitutional. Tr. of Oral Arg.
12-14. Moreover, this statute effectively abolishes both descent and devise of these property interests even when the
passing of the property to the heir might result in consolidation of property-as for instance when the heir already owns
another undivided interest in the property. 2 Compare 25
2

JUSTICE STEVENS argues that weighing in the balance the fact that

§ 207 takes the right to pass property even when descent or devise results

in consolidation of Indian lands amounts to an unprecedented importation
of overbreadth analysis into our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Post,
at - - . The basis for this argument is his assertion that none of appellees'-decedents actually attempted to pass the property in a way that might
have resulted in consolidation. But the fact of the matter remains that
before § 207 was enacted appellees' decedents had the power to pass on
their property at death to those who already owned an interest in the subject property. This right too was abrogated by § 207; each of the appellees' decedents lost this stick in their bundles of property rights upon the
enactment of § 207. It is entirely proper to note the extent of the rights
taken from appellees' decedents in assessing whether the statute passes
constitutional muster under the Penn Central balancing test. This is neither overbreadth analysis nor novel. See, e. g., Keystone Bituminous

85-637-0PINION
12

HODEL v. IRVING

U.S. C. §2206(b) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Since the escheatable interests are not, as the United States argues, necessarily de minimis, nor, as it also argues, does the availability of
inter vivos transfer obviate the need for descent and devise, a
total abrogation of these rights cannot be upheld.
In Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 (1979), this Court did
uphold against a "taking" claim a regulation prohibiting the
sale of eagles and eagle parts, whether legally acquired or
otherwise, in order to conserve the dwindling populations of
these birds. To be sure, in the bundle of rights that make up
ownership, the right of sale is of comparable importance to
the right to have the property pass on death. As in Allard,
appellees' decedents here retained the right to possess, use,
exclude and donate the property, id., at 66; the extent of
what is taken here in comparison to the rights left untouched
is similar. But Allard depends at least in part on the unique
characteristics of the property at issue in that case. Prohibition of the sale of existing legally obtained artifacts was
necessary to remove the incentive to poach since "there is no
sure means by which to determine the age of bird feathers;
feathers recently taken can easily be passed off as having
been obtained long ago." ld., at 58. Moreover, the payment of just compensation was not an available alternative in
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis,-- U. S., at--; 107 S. Ct., at 1248-1249
(discussing, in general terms, the extent of the abrogation of coal extraction rights caused by the Subsidence Act); Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 136-137 (discussing extent to which
air rights abrogated by the designation of Grand Central Station as a landmark, noting that not all new construction prohibited, and noting the availability of transferable development rights).
JUSTICE STEVENS' objections are perhaps better directed at the question
of whether there is third-party standing to challenge this statute under the
Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause. But as we have shown ,
there is certainly no Article III bar to permitting the appellees to raise
their decedents claims, supra, at--, and JUSTICE STEVENS himself concedes that prudential considerations do not bar consideration of the Fifth
Amendment claim. Post, at - - .
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Allard; owners of illegally obtained feathers may have been
happy to tender them to the government in return for compensation. Poaching, therefore, might have remained profitable absent an uncompensated prohibition against sale.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the Government accomplished its objective in this case by reallocating property
rights in the land and con~entrating ownership in the Tribe.
By contrast, the Act in Allard prevented the sale of property
but did not otherwise reallocate the owners' rights. For all
these reasons, then, Allard does not control the disposition of
this case.
In holding that complete abolition of both the descent and
devise of a particular class of property may be a taking, we
reaffirm the continuing vitality of the long line of cases
recognizing the States', and where appropriate, the United
States', broad authority to adjust the rules governing the
descent and devise of property without implicating the guarantees of the Just Compensation Clause. See, e. g., Irving
Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1942); Jefferson v.
Fink, 247 U. S., at 294. The difference in this case is the
fact that both descent and devise are completely abolished;
indeed they are abolished even in circumstances when the
governmental purpose sought to be advanced, consolidation
of ownership of Indian lands, does not conflict with the
further descent of the property.
There is little doubt that the extreme fractionation of Indian lands is a serious public problem. It may well be appropriate for the United States to ameliorate fractionation by
means of regulating the descent and devise of Indian lands.
Surely it is permissible for the United States to prevent the
owners of such interests from further subdividing them
among future heirs on pain of escheat. See Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 454 U.S. 516, 542 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
It may be appropriate to minimize further compounding of
the problem by abolishing the descent of such interests by
rules of intestacy, thereby forcing the owners to formally
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designate an heir to prevent escheat to the Tribe. What is
certainly not appropriate is to take the extraordinary step of
abolishing both descent and devise of these property interests even when the passing of the property to the heir might
result in consolidation of property. Accordingly, we find
that this regulation, in the words of Justice Holmes, "goes
too far." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. 8., at
415. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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JUSTICE ScALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's opinion, with the exception of
its proposed distinction of Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51
(1979). Ante, at--. Since the opinion acknowledges that
"the extent of what is taken here in comparison to the rights
left untouched is similar" to the balance in Allard, ante, at
- - ; and since that comparison is, under our established case
law, determinative of whether there has been a taking, see
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U. S. 104, 136 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U. S. 393, 413 (1922); I believe we should recognize that we
_
have limited Allard to its facts. JuSTICE O'CONNOR's opinion pr~pose~~stinctions of
Allard. It notes, first· that "prohibition of the sale of existing legally obtain~rtifacts was necessary to remove the
incentive to poach," and, ~. that ''[t~ of
justcompen8ation was not an available alternative." Ante,
at - - . Both these distinctions rest upon the premise that
the government may take property without just compensation if only its need to do so is _S!eat enough. That is
directly~thhangl.uigeof the Fifth Amendment,
which states "nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." It is also inconsistent with
our prior case law on the takings clause, which, as JusTICE
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STEVENS correctly notes, has assumed that "[t]he legitimacy
of the governmental purposes served by" the statute at issue
does not "excuse or mitigate whatever obligation to pay just
compensation is imposed by the Constitution." Ante, at
The Penn Central inquiry is, to be sure, a balancing
test, but it seems to me that JusTICE O'CONNOR's 1stinction
OfAllard mistakes the object of the inquiry and therefore
misidentifies the interests to be balanced. The object of the
inquiry is to determine whether, despite the government's
claim that it has merely exercised its police power, it has in
fact "taken" property and is thus required to proceed through
the eminent domain power. Whether property has been
"taken" is determined by balancing what the governmental
action withdraws from the property owner against what it
leaves him. In distinguishing Allard, however, JUSTICE
O'CONNOR instead balances the governmental i!!j,erest in the
regulation against lhe ow ·er'S interest in bemg free o 1t, an
approach which is to my knowledge unprecedented.
The third ground of distinction proposed by JUSTICE
O'CONNOR's opinion is that "it is important to recognize that
the Government accomplished its objective in this case by reallocating property rights in the land and concentrating ownership in the Tribe," ante, at - - . This distinguishes the
regulatory takings analysis of Allard only by calling into
question whether the present case is appropriate for regulatory takings analysis at all. To date we have applied the
regulatory takings approach only to laws that have an incidental effect on property rights, but whose primary purpose
is not to reallocate property. We have never applied ir to
governmental action that does not merely incidentally affect
private property in the course of pursuing a separate regulatory purpose, but that has as its very object the transfer of
property ownership. The latter is the kind of governmental
action we confront here. The present statute does not seek
to further the public health, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S.
623, 668-669 (1887), preserve historically significant struc-
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tures, Penn Central, supra, at 132, or prevent the destruction of a valuable national resource, Allard, supra, at 53.
Rather, as the Secretary explains, its purpose is to create a
new structure of ownership of land interests that Congress
believes will be more beneficial to Indians. Brief for Appellants 9-10.
While we held in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
467 U. S. 229 (1984), that transferring the private ownership
of property can be a "public purpose" for which the eminent
domain power may be used, we assuredly did not hold that
Congress could pursue that purpose by regulation, instead of
through eminent domain. To the contrary, our holding that
the law was constitutional was expressly conditioned on the
"assum[ption] . . . that the weighty demand of just compensation has been met." I d., at 245. See also Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, - - U. S. - (1987) (the purpose of the action is critical in assessing
whether the government is required to proceed by eminent
domain). This question of whether a law whose purpose and
effect is to transfer ownership necessarily involves the use of
the eminent domain power is, it seems to me, the only point
to which the suggested third distinction of Allard is relevant.
I do not see how the fact that a statute transfers ownership
has anything to do with Penn Central's balancing of rights
taken versus rights retained-or even, for that matter, with
the newly asserted criterion of whether the government has
a pressing need to take the property. If ownership transfer
has any relevance, it is to suggest that not only Allard but
Penn Central, supra, Pennsylvania Coal, supra, and our entire regulatory takings jurisprudence have no proper bearing
upon the resolution of this case. I nonetheless do not rely on
that ground, since I share the view that, even analysed as a
regulatory taking, this statute "goes too far," see Pennsylvania Coal, supra, at 415. I think it important to acknowledge, however, that we reach that conclusion notwithstanding Allard.
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JusTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
~
The question presented is whether the original version
of the "escheat" provision of the Indian Land Consolidation ~
...
Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-459, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519, effected
_ ,# , _.
a "taking" of appellees' decedents' property without just
compensation.
~~ 1
I
Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a
series of land Acts which divided the communal reservations
of Indian tribes into individual allotments for Indians and
unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. This legislation
seems to have been in part animated by a desire to force Indians to abandon their nomadic ways in order to "speed the Indians' assimilation into American society," Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U. S. 463, 466 (1984), and in part a result of pressure to
free new lands for further white settlement. Ibid. Two
years after the enactment of the General Allotment Act of
1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, Congress adopted a specific statute authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of the
Sioux Nation into separate reservations and the allotment of
specific tracts of reservation land to individual Indians, conditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the adult male
Sioux. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888. Under
the Act, each male Sioux head of household took 320 acres of

-
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land and most other individuals 160 acres. 25 Stat. 890. In
order to protect the allottees from the improvident disposition of their lands to white settlers, the Sioux allotment
statute provided that the allotted lands were to be held in
trust by the United States. 25 Stat. 891. Until 1910 the
lands of deceased allottees passed to their heirs "according
to the laws of the State or Territory" where the land was
located, ibid, and after 1910, allottees were permitted to
dispose of their interests by will in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. 36 Stat.
856, 25 U. S. C. § 373. Those regulations generally served
to protect Indian ownership of the allotted lands.
The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved
disastrous for the Indians. Cash generated by land sales to
whites was quickly dissipated and the Indians, rather than
farm the land themselves, evolved into petty landlords, leasing their allotted lands to white ranchers and farmers and living off the meager rentals. Lawson, Heirship: The Indian
Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 before
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess., 82-83 (1984). The failure of the allotment program
became even clearer as successive generations came to hold
the allotted lands. Forty- eighty- and 160-acre parcels became splintered into multiple undivided interests in land,
with some parcels having hundreds and many parcels having
dozens of owners. Because the land was held in trust and
often could not be alienated or partitioned the fractionation
problem grew and grew over time.
A 1928 report commissioned by the Congress found the
situation administratively unworkable and economically
wasteful. L. Meriam, Institute for Government Research,
The Problem of Indian Administration 40~41. Good, potentially productive, land was allowed to lie fallow , amidst great
poverty, because of the difficulties of managing property held
in this manner. Hearings on H. R. 11113 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on In-
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terior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966)
(remarks of Rep. Aspinall). In discussing the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Representative Howard said:

"It is in the case of the inherited allotments, however,
that the administrative costs become incredible. . . . On
allotted reservations, numerous cases exist where the
shares of each individual heir from lease money may be 1
cent a month. Or one heir may own minute fractional
shares in 30 or 40 different allotments. The cost of leasing, bookkeeping, and distributing the proceeds in many
cases far exceeds the total income. The Indians and the
Indian Service personnel are thus trapped in a meaningless system of minute partition in which all thought of
the possible use of land to satisfy human needs is lost
in a mathematical haze of bookkeeping." 78 Cong. Rec.
11728 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Howard).
In 1934, in response to arguments such as these, the Congress acknowledged the failure of its policy and ended further
allotment of Indian lands. Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. §461 et seq.
But the end of future allotment by itself could not prevent
the further compounding of the existing problem caused by
the passage of time. Ownership continued to fragment as
succeeding generations came to hold the property, since,
in the order of things, each property owner was apt to have
more than one heir. In 1960, both the House and the Senate undertook comprehensive studies of the problem. See
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Indian
Heirship Land Study, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print
1961); Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Indian Heirship Land Survey, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm.
Print 1961). These studies indicated that one-half of the
approximately 12 million acres of allotted trust lands were
held in fractionated ownership, with over three million acres
held by more than six heirs to a parcel. I d., at pt. 2, p. x.
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Further hearings were held in 1966, Hearings on H. R.
11113, supra, but not until the Indian Land Consolidation
Act of 1983 did the Congress take action to ameliorate the
problem of fractionated ownership of Indian lands.
Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act-the escheat provision at issue in this case-provided:
"No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust
or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent
[sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe
if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the
total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner
less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to
escheat." 96 Stat. 2519.
Congress made no provision for the payment of compensation
to the owners of the interests covered by§ 207. The statute
was signed into law on January 12, 1983 and became effective
immediately.
The three appellees-Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed,
and Eileen Bisonette-are enrolled members of the Oglala
Sioux Tribe. They are, or represent, heirs or devisees of
members of the Tribe who died in March, April and June
1983. Eileen Bisonette's decedent, Mary Poor Bear-Little
Hoop Cross, purported to will all her property, including
property subject to § 207, to her five minor children in whose
name Bisonette claims the property.
Chester Irving,
Charles Leroy Pumpkin Seed, and Edgar Pumpkin Seed all
died intestate. At the time of their deaths, the four decedents owned 41 fractional interests subject to the provisions
of § 207. App. 20, 22-28, 32-33, 37-39. The Irving estate
lost two interests whose value together was approximately
$100; the Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total values of
approximately $2,700 on the 26 escheatable interests in the
Cross estate and $1,816 on the 13 escheatable interests in the
Pumpkin Seed estates. But for § 207, this property would
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have passed, in the ordinary course, to appellees or those
they represent.
Appellees filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of South Dakota, claiming that § 207 resulted in a
taking of property without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. The District Court concluded that
the statute was constitutional. It held that appellees had no
vested interest in the property of the decedents prior to their
deaths and that Congress had plenary authority to abolish
the power of testamentary disposition of Indian property and
to alter the rules of intestate succession. App. to Juris.
Statement 21a-26a.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
Irving v. Clark, 758 F. 2d 1260 (1985). Although it agreed
that the appellees had no vested rights in the decedents'
property, it concluded that their decedents had a right, derived from the original Sioux Allotment Statute, to control
disposition of their property at death. The Court of Appeals
held that the appellees had standing to invoke that right and
that the taking of that right without compensation to decedents' estates violated the Fifth Amendment. 1
II
The Court of Appeals concluded that appellees have standing to challenge §207. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. The Government does not contest this ruling. As the Court of
Appeals recognized, however, the existence of a case or controversy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's
deliberations. I d., at 1267, n. 12. We are satisfied that the
necessary case or controversy exists in this case. Section
1
The Court of Appeals, without explanation, went on to "declare" that
not only the original version of§ 207, but also the amended version not before it, 25 U.S. C. §2206 (1982 ed., Supp. III), unconstitutionally took
property without compensation. Since none of the property which escheated in this case did so pursuant to the amended version of the statute,
this "declaration" is, at best, dicta. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of§ 207 as amended.
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207 has deprived appellees of the fractional interests they
otherwise would have inherited. This is sufficient injury-infact to satisfy Article III of the Constitution. See Singleton
v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 112 (1976).
In addition to the constitutional standing requirements, we
have recognized prudential standing limitations. As the
court below recognized, one of these prudential principles is
that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests. 758 F. 2d, at 1267-1268. That general principle, however, is subject to exceptions. Appellees here do
not assert that their own property rights have been taken unconstitutionally, but rather that their decedents' right to pass
the property at death has been taken. Nevertheless, we
have no difficulty in finding the concerns of the prudential
standing doctrine met here.
For obvious reasons, it has long been recognized that the
surviving claims of a decedent must be pursued by a third
party. At common law, a decedent's surviving claims were
prosecuted by the executor or administrator of the estate.
For Indians with trust property, statutes require the Secretary of the Interior to assume that general role. 25 U. S. C.
§§ 371-380. The Secretary's responsibilities in that capacity,
however, include the administration of the statute that the
appellees claim is unconstitutional, see 25 U. S. C. §§ 2202,
2209, so that he can hardly be expected to assert appellees'
decedents' rights to the extent that they turn on that point.
Under these circumstances, appellees can appropriately
serve as their decedents' representatives for purposes of
asserting the latters' Fifth Amendment rights. They are
situated to pursue the claims vigorously, since their interest
in receiving the property is indissolubly linked to the decedents' right to dispose of it by will or intestacy. A vindication of decedents' rights would ensure that the fractional
interests pass to appellees; pressing these rights unsuccessfully would equally guarantee that appellees take nothing.
In short, permitting appellees to raise their decedents' claims
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is merely an extension of the common law's provision for appointment of a decedent's representative. It is therefore a
"settled practice of the courts" not open to objection on the
ground that it permits a litigant to raise third parties' rights.
Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U. S. 405, 406
(1900).
III
The Congress, acting pursuant to its broad authority to
regulate the descent and devise of Indian trust lands, J efferson v. Fink, 247 U. S. 288, 294 (1918), enacted § 207 as a
means of ameliorating, over time, the problem of extreme
fractionation of certain Indian lands. By forbidding the
passing on at death of small, undivided interests in Indian
lands, Congress hoped that future generations of Indians
would be able to make more productive use of the Indians'
ancestral lands. We agree with the Government that encouraging the consolidation of Indian lands is a public purpose of high order. The fractionation problem on Indian reservations is extraordinary and may call for dramatic action
to encourage consolidation. The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux
Tribe, appearing as amicus curiae in support of the United
States, is a quintessential victim of fractionation. Forty
acre tracts on the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse reservation, leasing for about $1,000 annually, are commonly
subdivided into hundreds of undivided interests, many of
which generate only pennies a year in rent. The average
tract has 196 owners and the average owner undivided interests in fourteen tracts. The administrative headache this
represents can be fathomed by examining Tract 1305, dubbed
"one of the most fractionated parcels of land in the world."
Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing
on S. 2480 and S. 2663 before the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 85 (1984). Tract
1305 is forty acres and produces $1,080 in income annually.
It is valued at $8,000. It has 439 owners, one-third of whom
receive less than $.05 in annual rent and two-thirds of whom
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receive less than $1. The largest interest holder receives
$82.85 annually. The common denominator used to compute
fractional interests in the property is 3,394,923,840,000.
The smallest heir receives $.01 every 177 years. If the tract
were sold (assuming the 439 owners could agree) for its estimated $8,000 value, he would be entitled to $.000418. The
administrative costs of handling this tract are estimated by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $17,560 annually. !d., at 86,
87. See also Comment, Too Little Land, Too Many HeirsThe Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 709,
711-713 (1971).
This Court has held that the Government has considerable
latitude in regulating property rights in ways that may adversely affect the owners. See Keystone Bituminous Coal
Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. - - , - - - - - (1987);
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U. S. 104, 125-127 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S.
590, 592-593 (1962). The framework for examining the question of whether a regulation of property amounts to a taking
requiring just compensation is firmly established and has
been regularly and recently reaffirmed. See, e. g., Keystone
Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, supra, at - - ;
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1004-1005
(1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 295 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U. S. 255, 260-261 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 174-175 (1979); Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, supra, at 124. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE
has written:
"[T]his Court has generally 'been unable to develop any
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.'
[Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U. S.], at 124. Rather, it has examined the 'taking'
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question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors-such as the
economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
reasonable investment backed expectations, and the
character of the governmental action-that have particular significance. Ibid." Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
supra, at 175.
There is no question that the relative economic impact of
§ 207 upon the owners of these property rights can be substantial. Section 207 provides for the escheat of small undivided property interests that are unproductive during the
year preceding the owner's death. Even if we accept the
Government's assertion that the income generated by such
parcels may be properly thought of as de minimis, their
value may not be. While the Irving estate lost two interests
whose value together was only approximately $100, the Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total values of approximately
$2,700 and $1,816 on the escheatable interests in the Cross
and Pumpkin Seed estates. See App. 20, 21-28, 29-39.
These are not trivial sums. There are suggestions in the
legislative history regarding the 1984 amendments to § 207
that the failure to "look back" more than one year at the income generated by the property had caused the escheat of
potentially valuable timber and mineral interests. S. Rep.
No. 98-632, p. 12 (1984); Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 before
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Gong.,
2d Sess., 20, 26, 32, 75 (1984); Amendments to the Indian
Land Consolidation Act: Hearing on H. J. Res. 158 before
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Gong.,
1st Sess., 8, 29 (1983). Of course, the whole of appellees' decedents' property interests were not taken by§ 207. Appellees' decedents retained full beneficial use of the property
during their lifetimes as well as the right to convey it inter
vivos. There is no question, however, that the right to pass
on valuable property to one's heirs is itself a valuable right.
Depending on the age of the owner, much or most of the
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value of the parcel may inhere in this "remainder" interest.
See 26 CFR § 20.2031-7(0 (Table A) (1986) (value of remainder interest when life tenant is age 65 is approximately 32%
of the whole).
The extent to which any of the appellees had "investmentbacked expectations" in passing on the property is dubious.
Though it is conceivable that some of these interests were
purchased with the expectation that the owners might pass
on the remainder to their heirs at death, the property
has been held in trust for the Indians for 100 years and
is overwhelmingly acquired by gift, descent, or devise. Because of the highly fractionated ownership, the property is
generally held for lease rather than improved and used by the
owners. None of the appellees here can point to any specific
investment-backed expectations beyond the fact that their
ancestors agreed to accept allotment only after ceding to
the United States large parts of the original Great Sioux
Reservation.
Also weighing weakly in favor of the statute is the fact that
there is something of an "average reciprocity of advantage,"
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922),
to the extent that owners of escheatable interests maintain a
nexus to the Tribe. Consolidation of Indian lands in the
Tribe benefits the members of the Tribe. All members do
not own escheatable interests, nor do all owners belong to the
Tribe. Nevertheless, there is substantial overlap between
the two groups. The owners of escheatable interests often
benefit from the escheat of others' fractional interests.
Moreover, the whole benefit gained is greater than the sum
of the burdens imposed since consolidated lands are more
productive than fractionated lands.
If we were to stop our analysis at this point, we might well
find § 207 constitutional. But the character of the Government regulation here is extraordinary. In Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U. S., at 176, we emphasized that the
regulation destroyed "one of the most essential sticks in the
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bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude others." Similarly, the regulation
here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass
on a certain type of property-the small undivided interestto one's heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass
on property-to one's family in particular-has been part of
the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times. See
United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 627-628 (1896).
The fact that it may be possible for the owners of these interests to effectively control disposition upon death through
complex inter vivos transactions such as revocable trusts, is
simply not an adequate supstitute for the rights taken given
the nature of the property. Even the United States concedes that total abrogation of the right to pass property is
unprecedented and likely unconstitutional. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 12-14. Moreover, this statute effectively abolishes
both descent and devise of these property interests even
when the passing of the propE!rty to the heir might result
in consolidation of property-as for instance when the heir
already owns another undivided interest in the property. 2
2

JUSTICE STEVENS argues that weighing in the balance the fact that

§ 207 takes the right to pass property even when descent or devise results

in consolidation of Indian lands amounts to an unprecedented importation
of overbreadth analysis into our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Post,
at - - . The basis for this argument is his assertion that none of appellees' decedents actually attempted to pass the property in a way that might
have resulted in consolidation. But the fact of the matter remains that
before § 207 was enacted appellees' decedents had the power to pass on
their property at death to those who already owned an interest in the subject property. This right too was abrogated by § 207; each of the appellees' decedents lost this stick in their bundles of property rights upon the
enactment of § 207. It is entirely proper to note the extent of the rights
taken from appellees' decedents in assessing whether the statute passes
constitutional muster under the Penn Central balancing test. This is neither overbreadth analysis nor novel. See, e. g., Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. - - , - - (1987); (discussing, in
general terms, the extent of the abrogation of coal extraction rights caused
by the Subsidence Act); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
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Compare 25 U. S. C. § 2206(b) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill). Since
the escheatable interests are not, as the United States argues, necessarily de minimis, nor, as it also argues, does the
availability of inter vivos transfer obviate the need for descent and devise, a total abrogation of these rights cannot be
upheld. But cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 (1979) (upholding abrogation of the right to sell endangered eagles'
parts as necessary to environmental protection regulatory
scheme).
;::.In holding that complete abolition of both the descent and
devise of a particular class of property may be a taking, we
reaffirm the continuing vitality of the long line of cases
recognizing the States', and where appropriate, the United
States', broad authority to adjust the rules governing the
descent and devise of property without implicating the guarantees of the Just Compensation Clause. See, e. g., Irving
Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U. S. 556, 562 (1942); Jefferson v.
Fink, 247 U. S., at 294. The difference in this case is the
fact that both descent and devise are completely abolished;
indeed they are abolished even in circumstances when the
governmental purpose sought to be advanced, consolidation
of ownership of Indian lands, does not conflict with the further descent of the property.
There is little doubt that the extreme fractionation of
Indian lands is a serious public problem. It may well be
appropriate for the United States to ameliorate fractionation

I

City, 438 U. S. 104, 136-137 (1978) (discussing extent to which air rights
abrogated by the designation of Grand Central Station as a landmark, noting that not all new construction prohibited, and noting the availability of
transferable development rights).
JUSTICE STEVENS' objections are perhaps better directed at the question
of whether there is third-party standing to challenge this statute under the
Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause. But as we have shown,
there is certainly no Article III bar to permitting the appellees to raise
their decedents claims, supra, at - , and JusTICE STEVENS himself concedes that prudential considerations do not bar consideration of the Fifth
Amendment claim. Post, at - .
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by means of regulating the descent and devise of Indian
lands. Surely it is permissible for the United States to pre·vent the owners of such interests from further subdividing
them among future heirs on pain of escheat. See Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516, 542 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). It may be appropriate to minimize further compounding of the problem by abolishing the descent of such interests by rules of intestacy, thereby forcing the owners to
formally designate an heir to prevent escheat to the Tribe.
What is certainly not appropriate is to take the extraordinary
step of abolishing both descent and devise of these property
interests even when the passing of the property to the heir
might result in consolidation of property. Accordingly, we
find that this regulation, in the words of Justice Holmes,
"goes too far." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U. S., at 415. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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